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Wetlands are unique ecosystems that provide a multitude of direct and indirect services to 
the human population. Yet, these ecosystems continue to be one of the most threatened biomes in 
the world with unsustainable rates of loss and degradation. To address the social, environmental 
and economic consequences resulting from the loss of wetland services, several policy 
frameworks have been developed and implemented at various levels of government around the 
world. These frameworks have varying degrees of flexibility to balance the need to protect 
remaining wetlands and pursue economic development. This study examined Ontario’s policies 
governing wetlands and the competing interests surrounding land use decision-making of 
wetlands at the local level using a case study of a provincially significant wetland (PSW) in the 
City of Niagara Falls. A Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation was used to understand the problem 
surrounding the PSW and act as a decision-making support tool to effectively assess outcomes. 
Despite a high rate of inconsistency among participant’s responses, the results of the evaluation 
demonstrated a split desire for complete conservation of the study area and allowing partial 
development outside the PSW and buffer areas with ownership of the PSWs transferred to a 
public authority. Therefore, Ontario, which currently relies on a command and control policy 
approach to wetland management, may benefit from the adoption of market-based policy 
instruments that seek to balance wetland protection with economic development. However, the 
type of market instrument appropriate for Ontario will require further study to address 
inefficiencies highlighted in the current provincial approach and assess public support as some 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 Wetlands are unique ecosystems that provide a multitude of direct and indirect services to 
the human population. Yet, these ecosystems continue to be one of the most threatened biomes in 
the world with unsustainable rates of loss and degradation, often as a result of economic 
development. To address the social, environmental, and economic consequences as a result of the 
loss of wetland services, several policy frameworks have been developed and implemented at 
various levels of government around the world with varying degrees of flexibility to balance the 
need for wetland conservation and development. 
As will be demonstrated in the literature review below, the threat to wetlands and the 
need to protect them from further degradation is clearly accepted in academic literature. 
However, little attention has been given to the exploration of the attitudes towards wetlands in 
Ontario and the competing influences impacting local decision-making processes. In 2017, the 
Ontario government published a Wetland Conservation Strategy that seeks to identify threats to 
wetlands in the province and establish targets to address them by 2030 (Ontario Government, 
2017). To help inform Ontario’s 2030 wetland targets, this study seeks to provide insight into 
competing interests over wetlands in Ontario. The purpose of this study is to explore different 
wetland management approaches and compare them to Ontario’s current approach. A case study 
is then used to highlight challenges to Ontario’s current approach and identify acceptable 
compromises to stakeholders. The study will ultimately serve as a communication platform for 
competing interests in order to inform policy challenges.  
As a result of the literature review outlined in the following chapters, the subsequent 
research questions emerged.   
1) How does provincial policy ensure the protection of wetlands in Ontario? How 
effective are they?  
2) What are some challenges of the current wetland management system in Ontario? 
3) How does the local community and stakeholders view wetlands? How do they want 
them to be managed?  
4) How effective is a Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE) as a decision-making 
support tool? How can it support local decision-making of wetlands? 
SMCE is a decision aid tool that considers a collection of objectives and criteria that may 
be conflicting, multi-dimensional, incomparable, and incommensurable (Oamnn, 2000; 
Dodgson, Spackman, Pearman & Philips, 2009). SMCE provides insight into the nature of 
conflicts and assists at arriving at political compromises by increasing the level of transparency 
into the decision-making process. The approach attempts to do this by simplifying and ordering 
solutions to complex decision-making problems that may affect various stakeholders, and which 
may have several possible outcomes (Garmendia et al., 2010). This tool will be discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 6 (Methodology).  
The SMCE proved useful to address these research questions because of the conflicting 
values associated with wetlands among various societal groups. This makes the governance of 
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natural resources complex with uncertain and disproportionate consequences to various groups. 
SMCE seeks to address these concerns by providing a transparent and flexible framework to 
incorporate the knowledge of various stakeholders, some of whom are not typically included in 
formal decision-making processes (Reed, 2008), to improve the knowledge of a particular 
problem and effectively assess outcomes (Garmendia et al., 2010).  
To inform the research questions, a comprehensive literature review will first explore the 
value wetlands provide to human society and sources threatening wetlands around the globe.  An 
evaluation of policy approaches used by jurisdictions across North America to govern and 
protect these resources will then be explored. These approaches will be used to inform Ontario’s 
approach to wetland management. Lastly, a SMCE will be applied to a case study of a prominent 
land use conflict in the City of Niagara Falls to inform challenges faced by Ontario’s approach.  
Between the Government of Ontario, Conservation Authorities and municipalities, 
wetlands are governed by a plethora of policies either directly or indirectly using a command and 
control governance approach. However, several challenges emerged among various levels of 
government. Although the overall rate of wetland loss in the province has declined, there 
continue to be conflicts between the need for economic development and the preservation of 
ecological functions of provincially significant wetlands. This is partly due to disputes over the 
Ontario Wetland Evaluation System and the criteria to classify significant wetlands that warrant 
protection. Although policies are being enforced by the province, these policies and processes 
appear to be threatened by politically influenced decision-making at the regional and local levels.  
Other governance challenges include the lack of transparency and reported conflicts of 
interest in governing institutions such as Conservation Authorities. Also, the lack of adequate 
and sincere consultations, required under the province’s Planning Act, among residents, 
including indigenous communities, have resulted in damaged relationships and mistrust between 
decision-makers and the public. These inefficiencies are common criticisms found among 
command and control policies and threaten the effectiveness of wetland management.   
Despite a high rate of inconsistency among participant’s responses, the SMCE case study 
demonstrated that participants are split between the desire for complete conservation of the study 
area and allowing some development with public ownership over the wetlands. Therefore, the 
province may benefit from market-based policy instruments that seek to balance development 
and wetland protection. However, the type of market instrument appropriate for Ontario will 
require further study to address inefficiencies highlighted in the current system and assess public 
support as some market approaches have already demonstrated a lack of support. Additional 
studies to further support the findings of this study may prove valuable in resolving land use 




Chapter 2: Introduction to Wetlands  
2.1 What are Wetlands  
Several definitions of wetlands exist depending on the location and institution, but they 
are commonly identified by the presence of water seasonally or permanently, on the surface or 
deeply absorbed in the ground, each type with its own unique soil conditions that differ from 
upper lands, and support vegetation adapted to such wet conditions (Verhoeven & Setter, 2010). 
The most commonly cited definition comes from the Ramsar Convention Secretariat adopted in 
1971 that defines wetlands as “areas of marsh, fen, peat-land or water, whether natural or 
artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, 
including areas of marine water, the depth of which at low tide does exceed 6 m”. This 
intentionally broad definition seeks to include both coastal and inland landscapes such as 
swamps, marshes, lakes, peatlands, mangroves, estuaries, deltas and coral reefs, as well as man-
made lands including fishponds and rice paddies (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; 
Tolentino, 2013; Kim, 2010). The Ramsar Convention’s definition remains the global standard 
but is much broader than some definitions adopted at the national level and has been the source 
of much debate between jurisdictions (Finlayson, Davidson, Pritchard, Milton & Mackay, 2011). 
In contrast, Ontario defines wetlands as “lands that are seasonally or permanently covered by 
shallow water as well as lands where the water table is close to or at the surface. In either case, 
the presence of abundant water has caused the formation of hydric (waterlogged) soils and has 
favoured the dominance of either hydrophytic (water-loving) or water-tolerant plants” (Ontario 
Government, 2017). In addition to uncertainty as to how to define such landscapes, there 
continue to be varying perspectives on how to manage and whether to conserve such areas. As 
will be demonstrated throughout this section, there is a significant and urgent need to protect 
wetlands and to enforce strong, accountable policy to prevent their further loss and destruction.  
2.2 Importance of Wetlands 
Wetlands around the globe make up approximately 7-10 million km2, accounting for 
roughly 5-8 per cent of the world’s total land area (William & James, 2015; Xu, Jiang, Tan, 
Costanza & Yang, 2018). However, there continues to be difficulty providing an accurate 
estimate of remaining wetlands, resulting in inconsistent figures due to the lack of available 
information, technology and varying considerations of what constitutes a wetland (Hu, Niu, 
Chen, Li & Zhang, 2017). This lack of understanding is important to address because wetlands 
offer significant value to human beings as they provide many natural functions that support the 
provision of products, services, life systems and experiences at the local, regional, national, and 
international level depending on the type of function (Bond, Cox, Heberlein, Manning, Witty & 
Young, 1992).  
The lack of understanding of the rate to which global wetlands are being lost contributes 
to concern for biodiversity and natural resource management, leading to the emergence of an 
Ecosystem Approach. This approach focuses on delivering more integrated policy and 
management at a landscape scale directed towards human well-being (Haines-Young & Potschin, 
2010). The functions and services that wetlands provide include a variety of benefits that can be 
simply categorized into ecological, economic, and social services.  
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According to Costanza et al. (1997), ecosystem functions refer to the habitat, biological 
or system properties or procedures of an ecosystem. However, functions are often used to 
suggest an ecosystem’s capacity or capability to provide something useful to people, which is 
often used in definitions of ecosystem services (ES). For example, an ES is defined as the 
benefits to human well-being that are derived from the ecosystem (Costanza et al., 1997; MEA 
2005; Xu et al., 2018). Therefore, there continues to be debate around how to define and 
distinguish between ecosystem functions, services, and benefits to human well-being.  
The service cascade model has been criticized for its simplicity and unrealistically linear 
interpretation of real world links but remains a valuable tool to demonstrate the connection 
between the functions flowing from an ecosystem to a service and finally to a benefit for human 
well-being (Haines-Young & Potschin, 2010). The model’s purpose is to connect both ends of 
the ‘production chain’ linking ecological and biophysical structures and processes to elements of 
human well-being (Potschin & Haines-Young, 2011). Other iterations of the model suggest 
several intermediate steps. But this is sometimes a difficult connection to make depending on 
various geographical and societal factors. For example, wetlands have the potential to slow the 
flow of surface water which has the potential to reduce flood risk, which is useful to humans. 
However, this benefit is an indirect attribute of the ecosystem. Whether it is classified as an ES 
depends on if people consider it as a benefit, which is influenced by the geographical location 
and time (Haines-Young & Potschin, 2010). The cascade model attempts to clarify the direct and 
indirect benefits people derive from natural capital (Potschin & Haines-Young, 2011). Therefore, 
understanding the significant ecosystem functions, the factors constituting an ES, geographical 
location, and societal choices and values is necessary for holistic policy decisions.  
It is noteworthy that ecosystem functions and services do not always express a one-to-one 
relationship (Costanza et al., 1997).  In other words, it is not uncommon for a single ES to be a 
product of more than one ecosystem function and vice versa, therefore it is important to 
understand the links between functions and services before the implementation of policy 
initiatives. Some ES provided by wetlands are beneficial on a regional scale, including the ability 
to absorb large amounts of water and thereby act as a buffer zone to protect from extreme floods 
and storms (Verhoeven, Beltman, Bobbink & Whighman, 2006). Coastal wetlands typically 
support large areas of mangroves which protect shorelines from degradation and flooding 
(Adekola, Whanda & Ogwu, 2012). They also improve the quality of water which humans use 
for drinking water (MEA, 2005). Additionally, wetlands provide recreation and leisure for 
individuals who are within a proximity and find a spiritual connection with the natural 
environment (Herath, 2004; MEA 2005).   
Other ES benefit human well-being on a global scale, such as the ability to sequester 
carbon (Verhoeven et al., 2006), although these services are often unnoticed. Nonetheless, 
wetlands have natural regulatory and supportive services such as climate regulation, oxygen 
production, nutrient cycling, and soil formation that indirectly benefit human well-being 
(Adekola et al., 2012). In the following sections, the four types of wetland services that are 
supported by the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands – 1) provisioning, 2) supporting, 3) 
regulatory, and 4) cultural services – will be explored to demonstrate their natural significance to 
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the well-being of the human population. The valuation method of these services will then be 
discussed as a means for communicating the value of these services.  
2.2.1 Provisioning Services 
Provisioning ES refer to the products that can be obtained from ecosystems, including 
food, water, timber, fibre, and genetic resources (Mitsch, Bernal & Hernandez, 2015; MEA, 
2005). The two most significant services supporting human well-being are food (predominantly 
fish) and clean drinking water (MEA, 2005). The supply of renewable fresh water for human 
consumption comes from an array of inland wetlands such as lakes, rivers, swamps, and shallow 
groundwater aquifers (MEA, 2005). They have the capacity for groundwater recharge and water 
quality and quantity enhancement (MEA, 2005; Verhoeven et al., 2006; Ramsar Convention 
Secretariat, 2007; Durigon, Hickey & Kosoy, 2012). This is important as groundwater provides 
drinking water to roughly 1.5 – 3 billion people, used as source water for 40 per cent of industrial 
use (Verhoeven et al., 2006), and 20 per cent of irrigation usage (MEA, 2005). Therefore, in a 
time of foreseeable water scarcity, wetland services are becoming more valuable despite 
substantial losses (Verhoeven et al., 2006).   
Wetlands also support an abundance of biodiversity, particularly waterfowl, shellfish, 
fish, and plant life (Zedler & Kercher, 2005). In addition to providing an avenue of sustenance 
for individuals and their families, capture fisheries in coastal regions such as estuaries, marshes, 
mangroves, and coral reefs account for $34 billion in gross world product annually (MEA, 
2005). Wetlands also significantly contribute to a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
because of the natural goods and services available, leading to employment opportunities (Khan 
& Haque, 2010).  Since humans typically settle in concentrations around wetlands (Adekola et 
al., 2012), many employment opportunities depend on the resources provided. For example, the 
fisheries sector provided about 60 per cent of the dietary protein requirements for rural 
communities in Bangladesh and accounted for roughly 6 per cent of their GDP (Khan & Haque, 
2010).  
2.2.2 Regulatory Services  
Regulating ES encompasses many of the indirect benefits of wetlands that are often 
unnoticed.  This includes, air quality regulation, climate regulation, water purification, disease 
regulation, pest regulation, pollination, and the regulation of natural hazards such as flooding 
(Mitsch et al., 2015; MEA, 2005).  
For example, water purification and detoxification of wastes, particularly in marshes, 
have a significant role to play in treating contaminated water (de Groot et al., 2012). Some 
wetlands have even been attributed to the reduction of nitrate by over 80 per cent (MEA, 2005). 
Without these natural functions to purify the water supply, an increased risk of diseases may 
occur (MEA, 2005).  The threat of disease due to inadequate water, sanitation, and hygiene 
amounts to 1.7 million deaths and results in a loss of at least 54 million health life years per year 
(MEA, 2005).  Although there may be technological advancements to replace these natural 
services, they may not be widely assessible and affordable. Therefore, these natural ES are of the 
upmost importance to developing countries and marginalized communities.  
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In the face of increased discussion about climate change mitigation, wetlands play an 
important role in the regulation of the global climate through sequestering and releasing of 
carbon dioxide into the biosphere (Carpenter et al., 2009). For example, peatlands, although 
covering only an estimated 3-4 per cent of the world’s land area, have been estimated to store 
540 gigatons of carbon, representing roughly 1.5 per cent of the total estimated global carbon 
storage (MEA, 2005). In addition, as sea and precipitation levels rise, coastal and inland 
populations will be increasingly vulnerable to flooding and many other risks. However, 
mangroves, floodplains, lakes and reservoirs provide a physical buffer against climate change 
impacts (Turner et al., 2000; MEA, 2005). It is estimated that nearly 2 billion people live in areas 
with a high risk of flooding, which will be further exacerbated by the loss and degradation of 
wetlands (MEA, 2005). Therefore, wetlands provide provisioning services that are subtle but 
important protection for a significant portion of the population.  
2.2.3 Cultural Services 
Cultural ES are considered the benefits that individuals receive from the spiritual 
enrichment, aesthetics, recreation, ecotourism, formal and informal education, and cultural 
heritage (MEA, 2005). Wetlands have been acknowledged internationally for their significance, 
especially as it pertains to plant and animal (notably migratory birds) biodiversity (Verhoeven et 
al., 2006; Schulte-Hostedde & Schrubsole, 2003). International agreements such as the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands and the United Nations Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) 
acknowledge the urgent need to protect valuable natural areas because of their significance to the 
natural environment (Verhoeven et al., 2006). This includes riverine wetlands, shallow lakes, and 
coastal wetlands, which are important natural habitats for fish to reproduce (Verhoeven et al., 
2006).  This, in turn, provides area for recreational purposes such as hunting and sport, which 
support tourist attractions and considerable income. For example, recreational fishing in the 
United States generates a total of $24 – 37 billion annually (MEA, 2005).  
2.2.4 Supporting Services  
Supporting ES comprise basic natural processes such as nutrient cycling, soil formation 
and the hydrological cycle (MEA, 2005). These primary processes serve as the foundation for 
which the other three services and vital ecosystem functions derive (Mitsch et al., 2015; MEA, 
2005), which benefits the well-being of many people as demonstrated above.  
As previously mentioned, wetlands provide an abundance of services and benefits for 
human well-being as well as the natural environment. As the human population continues to 
grow, so does the demand for most ES (Carpenter et al., 2009).  However, there is concern that 
these critical functions face increasing risk of destruction and are not being protected to the 
extent necessary to ensure their continued existence (Costanza et al., 1997; Carpenter et al., 
2009; Adekola et al., 2012). There has been increased preference toward provisioning services to 
provide nutrients to support growing populations, which has ultimately resulted in the reduction 




2.2.5 Wetland Valuation 
As a result of the general preference towards provisioning ES, some policymakers have 
found themselves at odds with one another (MEA, 2005). To address this biased approach to 
wetland management, economists have attempted to convey the value of non-market ES in 
monetary terms to address the growing desire to include environmental and natural resources 
into the decision-making process (Carpenter et al., 2009; He, Dupras & Poder, 2016). Since 
many of these ES are non-market services and are instead perceived as positive externalities with 
no market value, policymakers encounter difficulties when conducting cost-benefit analysis 
when making decisions effecting wetlands (He et al., 2016). Using the valuation method, the 
values of non-market ES such as the regulation of water flows, habitat biodiversity, climate 
regulation, recreation and education are often greater than the economic gains that would be 
achieved from the conversion of wetlands to other uses such as agriculture or urban 
infrastructure (MEA, 2005; He et al., 2016).  
The valuation approach can therefore be used to highlight associated trade-offs between 
alternative management approaches (Xu et al., 2018).  For example, intact freshwater marshes in 
Canada are calculated to be valued at about $5,800/ ha in comparison to $2,400/ ha when they 
are drained and used for agriculture (MEA, 2005). However, studies such as these have been 
slow to emerge, with very few findings exploring practical management approaches (Xu et al., 
2018). Expressing ES in monetary units can also act as a guide to understand stakeholder 
preferences and make it easier to allocate resources among competing uses (de Groot et al., 
2012). For example, this approach has been used for the implementation of the CBD programme 
to integrate such values into national accounting systems (de Groot et al., 2012).  
It should be noted that many scholars acknowledge that there are some cases in which the 
benefits of converting a wetland exceed those of conserving it (Costanza et al., 1997; Carpenter 
et al., 2009).  However, as wetlands continue to be lost, the relative value of conserving 
remaining wetlands will increase (MEA, 2005). To understand these types of scenarios, 
valuation techniques attempt to place a common value, in many cases a dollar figure, on 
competing services to make informed decisions of the trade-offs (Carpenter et al., 2009). 
However, some critics caution this objective and quantifiable valuation technique which, is 
argued to have the potential to mask the complexity of critical processes underlying the 
production of ES behind monetary figures (Gomez-Baggethun & Ruiz-Perez, 2011). Although, 
Potschin and Haines-Young (2011) caution that valuation should only be applied to goods or 
services being consumed or used rather than the ecological structures and processes that support 
them. This is because the value of the structures and processes are already implied in the 
estimate and may contribute to various other goods and services, therefore should only be 
counted once. 
Some critics of this method of decision-making argue that it is ultimately impossible or 
unwise to place a monetary value on things that are intangible such as human life, environmental 
aesthetics, and long-term ecological benefits (Costanza et al., 1997). However, these approaches 
have commonly been used for other ES. Another argument against valuation is that wetlands 
should be conserved based on the moral obligation to protect the environment which does not 
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require valuation (Costanza et al, 1997).  This follows the critique posit that some things, for 
ethical reasons, should not be for sale and reject the frame of ES as commodities (O’Niell & 
Spash, 2000; McCauley, 2006). These concerns expressed around commodification are rooted in 
the commodity frontier (e.g. what should and should not be included in the realm of markets and 
trade) (Gomez-Baggethun & Ruiz-Perez, 2011). Additionally, some express concerns of equity 
exploitation resulting from commodification, turning publicly accessibly ES into commodities 
that can only be accessed by those with the purchasing power to do so (Gomez-Baggethun & 
Ruiz-Perez, 2011). These concerns are not meant to criticize commodification in its totality. 
Rather, concerns are centered on the limits of commodification of ecosystems and wildlife 
(Prudham, 2007).  
Since ES remain largely outside the market, they are often taken for granted or ignored, 
which results in the approval of development projects without considering the social and 
ecological costs of the decision (Costanza et al., 1997). It is argued by valuation proponents that 
expressing the monetary values of non-market ES has the ability to universally convey their 
relative importance to policymakers, which can help with the efficient allocation of funds by 
identifying where protection and restoration is needed most and the extent to which 
compensation should be paid for the loss of such services (de Groot et al., 2012). This does not 
suggest placing a price on such services, nor does it imply that they should be traded in private 
markets and treated as private commodities (de Groot et al., 2012). Rather, valuation is intended 
as an estimate of the various services provided by wetlands that benefit human well-being which 
will be greatly diminished if a wetland is degraded or lost (de Groot et al., 2012).  
2.2.6 Era of Wetland Exploitation  
Before ES valuation, the value of non-market ES derived from wetlands were easily 
overlooked. Kim (2010) uses three eras throughout human history to explain the evolution of 
wetland policy in developed countries. The first era, ranging from early civilization to the 1960s, 
is referred to as the Era of Wetland Exploitation (Kim, 2010). During this period, wetlands were 
drained and filled for agricultural practice and embankment projects for coastal safety measures 
(Kim, 2010).  As these practices developed, reasons for wetland destruction began to diversify 
with the introduction of industrialization and urban development (Kim, 2010).  
This era resulted in widespread destruction of wetlands, natural habitats, and ES due to 
intense pressure to develop for economic gain (Kim, 2010). Conversion practices were 
economically driven with little to no consideration for the negative consequences of the over-
exploitation of natural resources (Kim, 2010). The effects of this era have been long lasting. 
However, as the environmental impacts of wetland conversions received more attention, a shift 
away from economic pursuit to shed light on the importance of ecological sustainability began to 
take place (Kim, 2010). This shift is covered over two eras which will be further explored in later 
sections.  
2.3 Sources of Wetland Degradation  
Despite providing humans with a plethora of functions and services, wetlands continue to 
be one of the most threatened ecosystem types (Daniels & Cumming, 2008) as a result of human 
impact (Verhoeven et al., 2006; Li, Deng & Huang, 2010). It is estimated that 50 per cent of the 
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world’s wetlands have been lost due to human activity (Zedler & Kercher, 2005; Daniels & 
Cumming, 2008; Finlayson, 2012; Hu et al., 2017), with some reporting as high as 87 per cent 
loss since the beginning of the 18th century (Davidson, 2014). However, uncertainty around the 
exact rate and total area lost continues, largely due to limited historical data available and various 
definitions of what constitutes a wetland (Davidson, 2014; Hu et al., 2017).  
Most of the area of wetlands lost in the first half of the twentieth century occurred in 
northern countries, but since the 1950s there has been increased wetland conversions in tropical 
and subtropical regions as well (Zedler & Kercher, 2005). Asia has experienced the largest 
overall loss, specifically China, which has lost nearly 29 per cent of wetlands due to direct 
human activity (Hu et al., 2017). However, the most severe case of wetland loss has been 
observed in Europe, which has experienced a loss of 45 per cent, followed by South America and 
Asia with approximate losses of 32 and 27 per cent (Hu et al., 2017). The amount lost in North 
America remains largely uncertain due to the central focus on the United States. Figures range 
from 8 per cent loss as reported by Hu et al. (2017) to 56 per cent as reported by Davidson 
(2014).  
Some causes of this substantial loss have been attributed to agriculture, development 
practices, invasive species, pollution, and climate change (MEA, 2005; Verhoeven et al., 2006; 
Li et al., 2010; Durigon et al., 2012; Adekola et al., 2012; He et al., 2016; Hu et al., 2017). As a 
result, substantial but inconclusive evidence suggests that changes to wetland ecosystems 
increase the likelihood of unpredictable and potentially abrupt changes in ecosystems, which 
may have significant consequences for the human population (MEA, 2005). In the following 
sections, each of these sources of wetland destruction will be explored in further detail to 
understand their impact on the sustainability of wetlands. 
2.3.1 Agriculture 
One of the main indirect drivers that contribute to the degradation and loss of wetlands is 
population growth (MEA, 2005). The result of an increased population is the demand for 
increased production of food and housing, leading to the accelerated development of agriculture 
and urbanization (Hu et al., 2017). For example, in the United States, it has been estimated that 
25 – 30 per cent of wetlands have been lost as a result of rural and urban development, including 
agricultural practices (Hu et al., 2017). Natural wetlands such as floodplains have typically been 
cleared and drained for agricultural purposes (MEA, 2005; Zedler & Kercher, 2005; Tolentino, 
2013). By 1985, roughly 56 – 65 per cent of inland and coastal marshes had been drained in 
Europe and North America (MEA, 2005) and an estimated 26 per cent of global wetlands had 
been drained for agriculture purposes (Zedler & Kercher, 2005).  
Agricultural practices have had a wide range of adverse effects on wetlands 
internationally. About 70 per cent of global water use is allocated for irrigation, and nutrient 
loading (particularly nitrogen and phosphorus) in fertilizers has resulted in the decline of many 
ES such as drinking water availability and some fish species (MEA, 2005; Verhoeven & Setter, 
2010; Hu et al., 2017). The combination of drainage for irrigation and soil alterations has widely 
resulted in the destruction of their ecological integrity and ES (Verhoeven & Setter, 2010).  
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Despite intensive agricultural activity in the past, the rate of wetland loss attributed to 
agricultural practices since the early 1990s has significantly decreased, accounting for 20 per 
cent of wetland conversions (Gutzwiller & Flather, 2011). This is compared to urban and 
suburban development accounting for 57 per cent of losses (Gutzwiller & Flather, 2011).  
But the pressure on the agricultural sector to feed an increasing population poses new 
concerns. Global food production has doubled in the past 40 years and has been able to keep up 
with the needs of a growing population (MEA, 2005). However, based on projected increases in 
the global population since 2005, food requirements are predicted to increase 50 per cent by 
2030 (Verhoeven & Setter, 2010). These practices have come at a cost to biodiversity, 
disruptions to element cycles, eutrophication and toxification to freshwater sources, and loss of 
regulating ES as a result (MEA, 2005).  
2.3.2 Development Practices 
Development practices, particularly urban development, is another major cause of 
wetland degradation that can be traced in response to an increasing population. The Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005) found 80 – 98 per cent of global wetlands located in or adjacent to 
large urban areas had disappeared. This significant loss can be attributed to rapid economic 
development and increased population density resulting in urban sprawl around the globe (Mao 
et al., 2018). For example, China’s urban population between 1978 – 2012 increased from 17.9 
per cent to 52.6 per cent (Mao et al., 2018).  An increasing population often results in the 
expansion of a city’s infrastructure, putting wetlands in the surrounding area at extreme risk of 
degradation due to rapid land use changes (Holland, Honae, Gwin & Kentula, 1995). As a result, 
wetland ES such as natural habitat, recreational activities, flood mitigation, and air and water 
quality are threatened. Watersheds located within proximity of urban areas are often subject to 
clearing, land use changes, and overall fragmentation of the landscape as a result of development 
practices (Holland et al., 1995).  
As urban populations continue to increase, small wetlands are often destroyed because of 
the few remaining undeveloped areas or are among the cheapest areas to develop (Kentula, Gwin 
& Pierson, 2004). As the number of small wetlands being destroyed accumulates, nearby 
watersheds may reach a point to which it can no longer provide ES (Holland et al., 1995). 
Holland et al. (1995) found that remaining wetlands within urban areas had been altered or 
degraded to some extent by construction practices. As a result, sediments may be channelled into 
the wetland and may continue in the form of run-off after the project has been completed, 
thereby continuing to contaminate the wetland (Holland et al., 1995).  
Coastal wetlands are also at risk of development.  Nearly half of the globe’s major cities 
are settled within 50 kilometers of a coastline and are typically 2.6 times denser when compared 
to inland cities (MEA, 2005). Extreme population density in coastal areas places wetlands such 
as mangroves, one of the most productive and highly threated ecosystems in the world, at a high 




The rampant conversion of wetlands is driven, in part, by a shortage of suitable land 
space for agricultural and urban settlement and has been reinforced by the lack of consideration 
for the value ES provide to human society (He et al., 2016). As a result, economic costs related 
to flood damage have significantly increased over the past 100 years in large part due to 
agricultural and urban development (Zedler & Kercher, 2005). However, with increased research 
and recognition for the role wetlands play in flood mitigation, there has become increased 
interest in the restoration of wetlands (Zedler & Kercher, 2005). As the risk of extreme weather 
such as flooding increases, it will be ever more important to protect wetlands and their ES 
despite the pressure for further development (Kentula et al., 2004).  
2.3.3 Invasive Species 
Agricultural and urban runoff into wetlands consequently displace native plant species 
and create an environment which supports invasive plants (Zedler, 2003). Invasive plants are 
described as exotic, native, or hybrid plant species or strains that rapidly spread and overrun 
existing plant communities (Kercher & Zedler, 2004). These species have been linked to major 
local extinction of native freshwater species which drastically affect the biodiversity of the 
ecosystem. Two thirds of freshwater species introduced into the tropics and more than half of 
species introduced in temperate regions have established self-sustaining populations (MEA, 
2005) from nutrient rich runoff or groundwater sources (Zedler & Kercher, 2005).  
Wetlands that source water for agricultural and urban watersheds tend to be subjected to 
many invasive species, therefore, individual drivers of wetland loss and degradation such as 
agriculture and development practices, as mentioned above, should not be seen as separate 
factors, rather interconnected causes of increased human population and overexploitation. As a 
result, these invasive species affect both the biodiversity and human enjoyment of wetland 
ecosystems (Zedler & Kercher, 2005).  
2.3.4 Pollution 
 Studies focusing on global pollution have found that few places on Earth remain free of 
contaminants (Zedler & Kercher, 2005). This is partly attributed to the draining of wetlands and 
the effect on natural process of collecting the flow of nutrients and other substances, including 
pollutants. Agricultural and urban areas are primary sources of contaminants which typically 
contain large amounts of nitrates and phosphorus that stimulate algal growth (Zedler & Kercher, 
2005). The process of eutrophication, the decreased levels of oxygen in the water, increases the 
risk of death of fish species and disruptions to the aquatic food chain (Zedler & Kercher, 2005). 
This can lead back to humans by effecting commercial fishing and therefore sources of income 
and food supply for many individuals, enjoyment and recreational use of the wetland, and many 
other ES humans rely on.  
It is strongly encouraged by existing literature to reduce the use of pesticides and the risk 
of runoff due to the environmental hazards that may occur (Blankenberg, Haarstad & Baskerud, 
2007). However, even when fertilizer and pesticide use is reduced, agricultural fields will 
continue to discharge more surface water runoff and nutrients when compared to undisturbed 
soils (Zedler, 2003). Wetlands, such as rivers, lakes, creeks, and ponds, have natural processes 
such as sedimentation, uptake and adsorption to organisms, biological degradation, 
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photodegradation, diffusion and dilution to reduce contaminants (Blankenberg, Haarstad & 
Baskerud, 2007). Despite these processes, high concentrations of contaminants may persist in 
natural environments and the capacity to provide clean and reliable sources of water may be 
compromised (MEA, 2005; Blankenberg, Haarstad & Baskerud, 2007).  
2.3.5 Climate Change 
 Although climate change is expected to have varying effects around the globe with 
unestablished certainty of the exact effects, it is ultimately expected to exacerbate the loss and 
degradation of many wetlands, leading to increased threat to the species and human populations 
reliant on their services (MEA, 2005). In some regions, climate change is expected to increase 
drought due to increased temperatures and changes in precipitation patterns (Withey & van 
Kooten, 2011). This is likely to have adverse effects on agricultural ecosystems and the 
environment’s ability to support waterfowl (Withey & van Kooten, 2011). In other regions, 
increased precipitation is expected to provide some wetlands with pronounced harmful impacts 
to their ecosystems (MEA, 2005).  
Climate change is of particular concern for coastal wetlands due to rising sea levels and 
the elimination of wetlands along the coastal edge (Zedler & Kercher, 2005). As wetlands are 
filled by rising sea levels and destroyed from human expansion, this is likely to result in 
increased risk of flooding to nearly communities.  Especially as development practices are 
eliminating coastal wetlands at a rate of 1 per cent per year, increased risk to coastal populations 
is likely to occur (Zedler & Kercher, 2005).  
Despite inconsistent figures representing wetland loss, it is widely acknowledged that a 
significant proportion of historical wetland areas have been degraded or lost (Zedler & Kercher, 
2005). Permitting systems, exemptions, mitigation, and enforcement problems (Gutzwiller & 
Flather, 2011) have largely allowed the continuation of wetland conversion to continue. 
Although some wetland types have increased across the United States, such as manmade 
freshwater ponds to attract wildlife and floodplains which have formed as a result of beaver 
dams, the substantial loss of wetlands have lasting effects, most notable the loss of ES (Zedler & 
Kercher, 2005).  
The general preference for provisioning services to supply the human population with 
food and drinking water over the past century have been achieved at the expense of regulating, 
supporting, and cultural ecosystem services (MEA, 2005; Carpenter et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2018). 
These types of land-use decisions frequently involve deciding which trade-offs to make among 
ES where a preference for one service may be at the expense of another (Jessop et al., 2015). 
These decisions have typically been made with little sympathy for the needs of local residents 
who benefit most from the conservation of wetlands with a process that lacks sufficient 
transparency and accountability (MEA, 2005). This approach is misguided because local 
communities possess deep, practical knowledge of the connection between wetland condition 
and the provision of wetland ES that decision makers at many levels are unaware of (MEA, 
2005). Decisions are rarely made based on market and nonmarket services provided by wetlands, 
resulting in the exaggerated distribution of subsidies that encourage the drainage and destruction 
of wetlands for agricultural and development practices (MEA, 2005).   
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Chapter 3: Introduction to Decision Aid Tools  
 3.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 
 As demonstrated above, the value of wetlands in their natural state is clearly supported in 
academic literature. However, sources of degradation continue to threaten these ecosystems as 
the need for economic development persists. Some of these sources of wetland degradation are 
driven by alternative land uses, such as development practices as mentioned above, for economic 
gain and other social benefits to human society, therefore, damaging natural ecological processes 
that provide several widespread ES to serve immediate human needs. These conflicts leave 
wetlands caught in the middle of competing values and interests among various societal groups. 
So, how does one decide on the best approach to wetlands management?  
Environmental conflicts are typically complex, uncertain, multi-scale, and affect various 
social actors and institutions, requiring decision-making that is flexible, transparent, and 
incorporates the specialized knowledge of diverse stakeholders (Reed, 2008). As a result, 
decisions have often fallen short at the policy level due to the inability to consider all relevant 
options and their impacts on various stakeholder groups (Omann, 2000). 
The use of valuation techniques has contributed to making informed decisions by 
communicating, in monetary terms, the value of ES absent from a given market (Carpenter et al., 
2009). However, the complex nature of ES cannot always be adequately translated into economic 
valuation frameworks since ES may involve several competing interests and values over the 
same resource, leading to high levels of uncertainty at the decision-making level (Oikonomou, 
Dimitrakopoulos & Troumbis, 2011). Although economists have provided useful tools for 
environmental policy, these are by no means a complete tool for making informed environmental 
decisions.  
Scientists can also suggest solutions for environmental policy, but such expertise is 
ultimately limited at the decision-making level without input from the rest of society to inform 
policymakers (Omann, 2000; Munda, 2004). Local actors and citizens who traditionally have 
been excluded from the decision-making process can provide considerable value as non-experts 
by relating personal experiences on issues that experts may overlook (Garmendia et al., 2010). 
Decision-making should consider all relevant impacts of a decision before committing to a 
course of action. An effective way to do that is through the involvement of relevant stakeholders 
in the evaluation process (Omann, 2000).  
In light of continued over-exploitation and degradation of ES, the increased awareness 
and interest in the inter-connection and inter-dependency of ecosystems has emphasized the need 
for multi-dimensional frameworks that incorporate various values into the decision-making 
processes (MEA, 2005; Oikonomou et al., 2011). A tool typically used for environmental 
decision-making, especially at the micro-level, has been the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
(Omann, 2000). However, the use of CBA for complex issues has exposed several weaknesses in 
its approach (Omann, 2000).  
Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) was developed in response to the shortfalls of a 
CBA (Omann, 2000). The concept of multi-criteria analysis originated from the field of 
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economics to support decision-making processes and has recently been applied to natural 
resource management (Garmendia, Gamboa, Franco, Garmendia, Liria & Olazabal, 2010; Singh 
et al., 2016). MCDA refers to an approach and broad set of decision aid techniques that consider 
a collection of objectives and criteria that may be conflicting, multi-dimensional, incomparable, 
and incommensurable (Oamnn, 2000; Dodgson, Spackman, Pearman & Philips, 2009). Decision 
options may vary to the extent of achieving several objectives (Dodgson et al., 2009) but the 
approach is intended as a way of simplifying and ordering complex decision-making problems 
that affect various stakeholders, several possible outcomes, complex and sometimes uncertain 
criteria in order to effectively assess outcomes (Garmendia et al., 2010).  
The ultimate objective of MCDA is to aid decision-makers by addressing difficulties 
involved in dealing with large quantities of complex information in a consistent manner 
(Dodgson et al., 2009). It does this by structuring data sets to assess alternative actions to reveal 
(Messner, Zwurner & Karkuschke, 2006) a single preferred option, a rank of options, or identify 
acceptable versus unacceptable options to solve a given conflict (Dodgson et al., 2009). It should 
be noted that while MCDA cannot solve all conflicts, it can, however, provide insight into the 
nature of conflicts and assist with arriving at political compromises by increasing the level of 
transparency into the decision-making process (Martinez-Alier, Munda, O’Neill, 1998). 
Compromises are realized by teaching the decision-maker that it is often not possible to optimise 
all objectives at the same time (Munda, 2004). Therefore, a balance should be attempted among 
conflicting incommensurable values (Munda, 2004).  
One difficulty in this approach has been the subjectivity of decisions and identifying an 
operative definition of “value” despite societal actors who have different definitions, interests, 
goals, and cultural identities towards that “value” (Munda, 2004). MCDA addresses this problem 
by requiring the decision-making team to establish objectives and criteria, identifying their 
relative importance by attributing weights, and deciding the level of contribution of each option 
to each criterion (Dodgson et al., 2009). MCDA uses subjective aggregation of data, criteria 
definition and weighing for the purposes of evaluating individual strategies (Messner et al., 
2006). This subjectivity may be a cause of concern, but it is important to note that any evaluation 
method, including CBA in the selection of a proper discount rate, explicitly or implicitly relies 
on subjective elements as well (Messner et al., 2006).  
MCDA has several advantages, one of which being the ability to compare different 
options, assessed through specific criteria with different units of measure (Singh et al., 2016).  
Criteria are thus able to be measured and compared on a variety of scales regardless of the unit 
(qualitative, quantitative, mixed) (Omann, 2000), making it possible to manage complex 
problems that CBA cannot (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Siciliano, 2009; Singh et al., 2016). 
Thus, MCDA attempts to deal with weak comparability – evaluation of units with different, and 
therefore irreducible, but still comparable measures (Martinez-Alier, et al., 1998; Munda, 2004; 
Singh et al., 2016). This is in contrast to strong comparability in which a single comparative 
value is shared and can be ranked among all criteria (Martinez-Alier, et al., 1998). In addition, 
transparency of the process enables one to express the evaluation of all criteria in relation to their 
unit of measure, which eliminates the need to convert criteria into unique values such as dollar 
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figures (Siciliano, 2009). This also allows any decision-making group to analyse the chosen 
objectives, criteria, scores and weights, and make changes if it is felt appropriate (Dodgson et al., 
2009). MCDA is unique from other decision analyses, such as CBA, because of its ability to 
consider large data sets, relations and objectives that are directly attributable to a real-world 
decision-making problem and can be analyzed from various dimensions (Martinez-Alier et al., 
1998).  
A potential downside of MCDA could be that it may fail to identify a single best solution 
on the grounds that different parties and interests are involved (Dodgson et al., 2009; Singh et al., 
2016). However, it could be argued that this is not the objective of the method. Rather, it is to 
identify acceptable compromises for all relevant stakeholders and serve as a communication 
platform with which competing interests can interact (Munda, 2004; Reed, 2008; Singh et al., 
2016). Furthermore, what could be identified as the ‘best’ option may be in contrast to the goal 
of improving welfare, thus no action may be, in principle, the most acceptable option (Dodgson 
et al., 2009).  
3.1.1 Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation  
 Social multi-criteria evaluation (SMCE) has evolved from MCDA and is defined as a 
process which combines multi-criteria analysis with institutional and social analyses (Siciliano, 
2009). The defining characteristic of SMCE is its capacity to include the local community and 
therefore increase democracy within the evaluation process (Siciliano, 2009). The purpose of this 
communal participation is to improve knowledge of a particular problem (Munda, 2004; 
Garmendia et al., 2010). Therefore, public participation should be considered as a necessary but 
not a sufficient component of the process (Munda, 2004). It is also important to account for 
social discrepancies such as influence of powerful stakeholders, lack of representation of 
qualitative research approaches (e.g. in-depth interviews, focus groups, etc.), and inclusion of 
non-organized societal actors (Garmendia et al., 2010). SMCE processes are built on the 
importance of transparency, therefore ethical judgements of the components of the evaluation 
process must be transparent (Munda, 2004; Garmendia et al., 2010).  
 A multi-criteria framework depends on the process itself since the subjective nature of 
the problem will greatly affect the results (Munda, 2004). However, below is a general overview 
of the five steps of a SMCE.  
3.1.1.1 Scoping  
The first step of the SMCE process is to conduct a historical analysis to determine the 
purpose of the evaluation, define the geographical and temporal scales, parties involved, power 
dynamics, and past solution attempts to gain a better understanding of the problem before 
engaging with participants (Singh et al., 2016).  Official administrative or legal documents, 
newspaper articles, reports, interviews, and surveys may be used to provide this context 
(Siciliano, 2009; Singh et al., 2016). In doing so, examining the conflict will result in the 
identification of existing institutional structures that may influence the outcome of the issue and 
may or may not already be included in the decision-making process (Messner et al., 2006).   
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3.1.1.2 Institutional and Stakeholder Analyses 
The institutional and stakeholder analyses are then used to gain a deeper understanding of the 
conflict in addition to the structural dynamic among involved actors and their vested interests 
(Garmendia et al., 2010). The analyses are used to define the natural phenomenon, identify 
affected individuals, groups and organizations (which may include non-humans, non-living 
entities, and future generations), and prioritize their involvement in the decision-making process 
(Reed, 2008). For studies involving stakeholders and the environment, these analyses can be 
useful to identify the ES that are significant to each stakeholder group (Oikonomou et al., 2011).  
3.1.1.3 Generating Options and Criteria  
The development of options and criteria are taken from the discussions with stakeholders 
(Oikonomou et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2016). Based on discussions about the ES and potential 
threats to them, stakeholders/participants are asked to express their desired outcomes and 
expectations regarding potential actions to protect the identified ES (Oikonomou et al., 2011). 
These outcomes can be in the form of identifying restricted activities or the encouragement of 
others (Oikonomou et al., 2011) through policy strategies (Messner et al., 2006). These policy 
options will broadly reflect four basic outcomes which include (1) business as usual, (2) the ideal 
best option, (3) a hypothetical worse case scenario, and (4) a compromise solution (Garmendia et 
al., 2010). The participants will then be asked to identify criteria to evaluate each policy option 
as indicators of success based on their objectives which can often be categorized into social, 
economic, environmental, and cultural criteria (Munda, 2004).  
3.1.1.4 Weighing and Scoring  
Multi-criteria analyses apply numerical analysis in two stages. Scoring is first done on a 
numerical scale to reflect the expected outcomes of each option to represent the performance of 
each option according to the criterion (Garmendia et al., 2010). Then each criterion is weighted 
numerically based on the relative importance when a shift occurs in the scales (Dodgson et al., 
2009; Singh et al., 2016).  
It is also possible to establish thresholds for cases in which an option is rejected if the 
threshold of one criterion is not met (Dodgson et al., 2009). With the use of computer programs, 
the two stages are combined, and an overall assessment of each option is conducted in a 
consistent manner assisted by previous consultations with stakeholders (Dodgson et al., 2009). 
As a result, rankings of the options are presented in addition to the distance between the various 
options in terms of acceptability (Dodgson et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2016). In the case of 
conflicting values or criteria, the weighing process is used on the criteria which reflects the 
structures outlined by consulted stakeholders or a conflict analysis is used to evaluate the gains 
and losses of all impacts on the different groups involved to form compromise solutions (Omann, 
2000).  
3.1.1.5 Sensitivity Analysis  
The last step of the SMCE is to conduct a sensitivity analysis to reveal whether a change in 
weights may affect the results (Singh et al., 2016). Doing so helps to ensure the robustness of the 
test results, informs the understanding of relationships between inputs and outputs, reduces 
uncertainty by identifying the criteria used for inputs, checks for errors, and enhances 
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communication among decision makers (Singh et al., 2016). The analysis is conducted by 
observing how the ranking of options may change depending on different scoring or weighing 
scenarios (Dodgson et al., 2009). This may result in multiple options consistently ranking among 
the best options, which may indicate that some options can be associated with a slight loss of an 
overall benefit (Dodgson et al., 2009). These are important things to consider in SMCE, 
especially due to the subjectivity of the process it is important to analyze the validity of the 
results.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide information on the processes of the SMCE. In the 
following chapter, the process will be applied to the case study of the land use conflict in the 
City of Niagara Falls, Ontario. It will begin with an in-depth problem analysis consisting of a 
legal, stakeholder and historical analysis. It will then be followed by a discussion of the decision-
making options and criteria. Lastly, the results will be outlined followed by a discussion and 





Chapter 4: Policy Approaches to Wetland Management  
4.1 Wetland Protection and Sustainable Use  
There is a growing consensus for the need to protect remaining wetlands despite 
perceived economic benefits from their development (La Peyre, Mendelssohn, Reams, Templet 
& Grace, 2001; Durigon et al., 2012; Peimer et al., 2017; Vaissière, Levrel & Pioch, 2017).  
Herath (2004) suggests that a key element to successful wetland management is obtaining an in-
depth understanding of stakeholders and ecological processes unique to wetland systems and 
integrating this knowledge into management strategies. A downfall of many current wetland 
protection strategies is they are often embedded within broader frameworks of water and 
biological resource protection (Peimer et al., 2017). This general policy focus can result in weak 
environmental protection because wetland-specific needs become diffused or overpowered by 
broader objectives of the government (Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 2010). This is also true 
when there are wetland-specific chapters or sub-chapters, which are often framed in the broader 
context of environmental protection. Therefore, wetland-specific policies are useful to recognize 
the unique problems wetlands face with targeted action to address them (Ramsar Convention 
Secretariat, 2010).  
4.1.1 The Era of Policy Transition 
 Between the 1970s and 1990s, greater understanding of the importance of wetland 
conservation in response to the negative impact on wildlife populations, particularly migratory 
birds lead to what Kim (2010) refers to as the Era of Policy Transition. Previous wetland 
management strategies that allowed conversions for economic gain were no longer appropriate 
and consideration for wetland ecosystem functions such as production, regulation, and carrier 
functions was necessary (Kim, 2010). A greater understanding of ES led to the recognition of the 
value natural wetland systems provide such as their ability to function as a buffer zone between 
land and sea (Kim, 2010). Thus, these values began to appear in planning and decision-making 
processes when deciding which areas to develop. During this era, many attempts were made to 
protect and conserve wetland ecosystems at the international level. The most notable is the 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, which led to the Ramsar Convention in 
1971 (Kim, 2010).  
4.1.2 The Ramsar Convention  
The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention) 
is an intergovernmental environmental treaty with the goal of leading a collaborative framework 
and policy mechanisms that promote the conservation and wise use of wetlands, including their 
ES around the globe (Matthews, 1993; Finlayson et al., 2011; Finlayson, 2012; Peimer et al., 
2017). It was signed on 2 February 1971 by representatives from 18 countries that were 
concerned about the dramatic loss and degradation of wetlands around the world (Finlayson et 
al., 2011). Negotiations leading to the Ramsar Convention began with the establishment of a 
mechanism for the protection of waterfowl by creating an international network of sanctuaries 
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for migratory birds, but as negotiations progressed, the conservation and wise use of wetlands 
became the centre of discussions (Finlayson et al., 2011).  
The Ramsar Convention relies on the collaborative effort of neighboring countries to 
protect water systems that support the international circulation of water and support of 
transboundary species (Matthews, 1993). Its aim is to conserve wetlands deemed important by 
individual national governments at an international level by encouraging the adoption of 
management regimes (Farrier & Tucker, 2000). As of February 2020, the list of Ramsar sites 
includes 170 Contracting Parties with 2,388 designated Ramsar Sites covering a total area of 
253,870, 023 hectares (Ramsar, 2020). 
When a party signs on to the Ramsar Convention, it commits to the inclusion of wetland 
conservation planning policies within its national boundaries and to implement this planning in a 
way that promotes the wise use of wetlands within their jurisdiction (Finlayson et al., 2011). The 
parties also commit to the designation of at least one wetland that meets the Convention’s nine 
criteria for site selection to the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance within its 
territory, and to apply the Convention’s Strategic Framework and Guidelines for the Further 
Development of the List of Wetlands of International Importance to ensure a cohesive network 
of sites (Farrier and Tucker, 2000; Finlayson et al., 2011).  
Although the ‘wise use’ principle is mentioned in the 1971 text, a definition of this 
concept was not provided at the time (Finlayson et al., 2011). It was only at the Third Conference 
of the Parties (COP3, 1987) that this concept was defined as “their sustainable utilization for the 
benefit of humankind in a way compatible with the maintenance of the natural properties of the 
ecosystem” (Finlayson et al., 2011, p. 183-184) but has since evolved to reflect the more specific 
objective of maintaining the “ecological character” of wetlands as opposed to the broad language 
of “sustainable utilization” (Tolentino, 2013). However, several definitions of ‘wise use’ have 
been used to explain the need to maintain the ecological character of wetlands (Farrier and 
Tucker, 2000; MEA, 2005; Finlayson et al., 2011; Finlayson, 2012). Nonetheless, the focus of 
these definitions recognizes the interdependence of human beings and the environment and the 
essential need to maintain a wetland’s ‘ecological character’, defined by Farrier and Tucker 
(2000) as the structure and interrelations among biological, chemical, and physical mechanisms 
resulting from the interconnections of particular processes, functions, attributes, and values of 
wetland ecosystems. The adoption of this principle ensures a clear framework demonstrating 
how direct and indirect drivers of ecosystem alteration affect the ability of an ecosystem to 
deliver ES that support human well-being (Finlayson et al., 2011).  
The Ramsar Convention’s approach to the wise use of wetlands highlights critical 
connections between humans and the sustainable use of natural resources in a manner that 
encourages community engagement and transparency in deciding amongst trade-offs and 
equitable outcomes for conservation (Finlayson et al., 2011). It does this by taking into account 
economic benefits in addition to cultural values and natural heritage in the decision-making 
process, thereby adopting a joint, integrated and multi-disciplinary approach to wetland 
management (Tolentino, 2013).  
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Despite international efforts by the Ramsar Convention, global wetland coverage 
continues to decline among the increasing number of wetland policies, leading some to question 
the effectiveness of the Convention and the frameworks put forth at the national level (Farrier 
and Tucker, 2000; Finlayson, 2012; Tolentino, 2013). The Convention’s approach to wetland 
management is criticized by some, claiming it is limited by its segmented approach to land and 
water rather than the catchment as a whole system (Farrier and Tucker, 2000). By considering 
the entire system, it is argued that it would help identify threats tracing back to a variety to 
sources (Farrier and Tucker, 2000). The focus on ‘wise use’ has also been criticized for its 
emphasis on human values as opposed to the maintenance of a pristine habitat (Farrier and 
Tucker, 2000).  
Another drawback of the Ramsar Convention is the dependence on individual nations to 
implement its framework. Although the Ramsar Convention has developed a definition of what 
constitutes a wetland, countries are not required to adopt this interpretation and many countries 
have yet to establish a clear definition of a wetland in their jurisdiction (Tolentino, 2013). There 
is also concern over a country’s selection process to the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance. Without an understanding of a wetland’s hydrological and biological interaction 
among a larger ecosystem, the proper selection of ‘important’ wetlands may fall short (Durigon 
et al., 2012). Since selection to the List is made by individual nations, there is no governance of 
the geo-spatial distribution on a global scale (Durigon et al., 2012), which may contribute to the 
loss of wetlands that support significant ES to human well-being and natural habitat for 
migratory birds, especially with the lack of guidance on how to balance conservation with 
sustainable use from an ecological perspective (Finlayson et al., 2011). In spite of these 
concerns, the Ramsar Convention’s pressure to ensure wise use of wetlands, has encouraged the 
adoption of several mechanisms around the world to achieve just that. The movement towards 
sustainable wetland management reflects Kim’s (2010) third era of historical wetland policy 
called the Era of Wetland Conservation.  
4.1.3 The Era of Wetland Conservation  
 From the 1990s to present day is what Kim (2010) refers to as the Era of Wetland 
Conservation. During this time period, developed countries, including the USA, Netherlands, 
Germany, and UK, led the world in wetland policy with the purpose of preserving wetland 
ecosystem functions and services with new technologies and systems aimed to facilitate the wise 
and sustainable use of wetlands (Kim, 2010). The perception of wetlands switched from an 
exploitive nature, emphasizing consumerism, privatization and commercialization, to that of a 
conservative nature, reflecting non-consumptive, public, and non-commercial uses (Kim, 2010). 
This new ecological focus promoted cultural ES that had previously been excluded from policy 
decisions.  
 It should be noted that not all countries have entered this era. Those with a need for 
economic development continue to prefer conversions of wetlands in order to satisfy the needs 
outlined in previous eras. But developed, or what Kim (2010) refers to as ‘advanced’, countries 
that have the resources and social capital will implement wetland conservation policies as they 
move to this third era (Kim, 2010).  
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 There are three characteristics that Kim (2010) uses to identify whether a nation has 
entered this third era.  The first is whether the nation has established a strict review system for 
permitting wetland conversions to determine if it is socially urgent or unavoidable, such as rising 
sea levels.  The second characteristic is whether the government requires strict mitigation or 
replacement of wetland functions when one has been lost to restore reclaimed wetlands as seen 
in the EU and their use of de-polderisation. Lastly, new uses and activities will have arisen from 
the increased awareness and appreciation for wetland ecosystem services, fostering increased 
desire to protect ecologically significant wetlands. In an effort to demonstrate the complex nature 
of wetland management, the following sections will explore and evaluate various policy 
mechanisms used to manage the services provided by wetlands.  
4.2 Command and Control 
 Each policy mechanism tries to solve a similar problem, whether it is the reduction or 
elimination of pollutants or preservation of natural space, it is the behaviour that each 
mechanism capitalizes on that sets them apart. Command and control, for example, primarily 
uses coercion to ensure compliance while market-based mechanisms typically focus on 
incentives (Karp & Gaulding, 1995).  
Command and control policies generally refer to attributions exclusive to the State 
(federal, state or local) system (Karp & Gaulding, 1995; Porto & Lobato, 2004). They include a 
rigid regulatory scheme that relies on the law and police enforcement power to induce 
compliance with the application of sanctions (Karp & Gaulding, 1995; Porto & Lobato, 2004). 
When the actions of individuals, institutions, or nature go against a society’s desires or 
expectations, command and control regulations have traditionally been the dominant government 
response to shift human or ecosystem behaviours back to a predictable and controlled state 
(Holling & Mefe, 1996; Sinclair, 1997). These types of regulations were used when a problem 
was perceived and a solution was formulated to control it in a direct, feasible, and effective 
manner through the control of the processes proactively, leading up to, in response to, or after the 
problem had already occurred (Holling & Meffe, 1996). These policies were often in the form of 
compulsory legal norms for polluters, outright bans, limits to emissions, and technical 
requirements for particular products (Sánchez & Deza, 2015). Command and control policies are 
centred around the idea that polluters should be required to compensate society for the damage 
they have created by paying the cost of the pollution generated through some penal means 
(Sánchez & Deza, 2015).  
 In the face of declining natural resources and a growing population, this approach applies 
a strict hierarchical, top-down management style to natural resources in order to control 
ecosystems and socioeconomic institutions that respond to sporadic ecosystem behaviour with 
strict control policies (Holling & Meffe, 1996; Knight & Meffe, 1997; Durigon et al., 2012). The 
use of this approach has predominantly been in an effort to control the environment for the 
purposes of harvesting products, reducing threats to the human population, and establishing 
highly predictable outcomes in the short-term for the benefit of society (Holling & Meffe, 1996). 
From a command and control perspective, nature is regarded as ordered, segmented, and 
mechanistic, with strict cause-and-effect relationships, therefore, governing agencies must be 
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compartmentalized into specialties to manage such processes (Knight & Meffe, 1997). Its 
purpose is grounded by a desire to turn an unpredictable and ‘inefficient’ natural system to a 
predictable and economically efficient system that benefits a growing society (Holling & Meffe, 
1996; Khan & Haque, 2010). It does this by applying sanctions – in the form of financial 
incentives (fines), incarceration, and negative external outcomes such as tarnished reputation – 
high enough to instill fear of punitive consequences to achieve compliant behaviour (Karp & 
Gaulding, 1995).  
4.2.1 United States Clean Water Act  
 Although command and control mechanisms are common in environmental policy, it was 
strongly emphasized in the initial implementation of the United States Clean Water Act of 1972 
(Porto, 2004). It did this by creating a program with a strong central authority in the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that was carried out at the state level with extremely 
ambitious and restrictive goals of protecting against sources of water pollution (Porto, 2004). 
However, despite efforts and large investments, the water quality objectives required under the 
Act failed to be met due to two major difficulties. The first was the inefficiency of controlling 
pollution through inspections, and the second was the complex nature of controlling non-point 
sources of pollution due to the inability to identify a known ‘violator’ (Porto, 2004). Immense 
difficulties in identifying, measuring, and controlling non-point sources of pollution made it 
difficult to effectively allocate responsibility over the control of such pollutants (Knopman & 
Smith, 1993). Additionally, the costs of controlling the complexity of non-point sources were 
seen to greatly exceed the controls required for point sources which leads many to believe 
alternative policy mechanisms are required (Knopman & Smith, 1993; Robertson, 2006; Vatn, 
2015). As a result, the restrictive command and control mechanisms in the Clean Water Act 
persisted for only three decades due to the huge financial investment, giving the impression that 
this approach is not feasible for a jurisdiction with limited financial capacity (Porto & Lobato, 
2004).  
4.2.2 Evaluating Command and Control  
 Despite being considered an outdated, costly, and inefficient policy instrument (Hahn & 
Stavins, 1991; Sinclair, 1997; Knight & Meffe, 1997), command and control regulations have 
been credited in one major way, achieving desired results, at least in the short term. Given its 
strict thresholds and punitive measures, the risk of being punished is generally enough to deter 
most actors from noncompliance (Sánchez & Deza, 2015). If sanctions are not feared due to a 
lack of severity, command and control policies will have little to no effect (Karp & Gaulding, 
1995), as was demonstrated in the discussion of the Clean Water Act. Another advantage of 
command and control policies, particularly as they relate to watersheds, is that they do not need 
extensive data sets on individual river basins, thereby saving the governing agency in monitoring 
costs (Porto & Lobato, 2004). Although, this lack of upfront research is susceptible to criticism, 
in complex socio-ecological systems in which wetlands are a part of, several factors need to be 
considered before determining the success of a policy instrument.  
The initial phase of command and control policies are almost always successful in their 
response to the loss of ecosystem resilience (Holling & Meffe, 1996). As a consequence, 
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agencies responsible for the management of the resource often shift their focus from research and 
monitoring of the problem to methods of improving the internal functioning of the agency 
through cost efficiency and institutional survival (Holling & Meffe, 1996). As a result, the 
agency often becomes detached from public signals of concern and grow rigid in their response 
to ecological changes (Hahn & Stavins, 1991; Holling & Meffe, 1996). Additionally, command 
and control instruments rely on the imposition of pollution control with little decision-making 
power given to technicians and agencies responsible for the process (Porto & Lobato, 2004). As 
a result of this rigidity, economic losses can be substantial which may damage the effectiveness 
of the policy in some cases (Porto & Lobato, 2004). This can have severe negative impacts on 
external groups, such as local communities, who are dependent on such resources and are rarely 
consulted or given decision-making power (Knight & Meffe, 1997). Through analysis of the 
Clean Water Act, shortcomings could be attributed to the dominant role of the state on the 
behaviours of social actors. Rather than creating a policy to stimulate innovation and collective 
decision-making, the command and control approach enforced by the Clean Water Act imposed 
strict, rigid, costly, and therefore inefficient measures. 
As agencies become more rigid with their approaches to resource management, they may 
become less effective at responding to changing environmental circumstances, which may lead 
to a lack of confidence and mistrust by local actors (Mendez, Isendahl, Amezaga & Santamaria, 
2012). Alternatively, some societal groups may fixate on the initial successes of command and 
control policies and advocate for greater implementation, ignoring underlying ecological changes 
and further emphasizing an inflexible structure (Holling & Meffe, 1996). Command and control 
approaches inherently assume problems are clearly defined, relatively basic, and generally 
consistent with a linear cause-and-effect relationship (Holling & Meffe, 1996). This can have 
damaging effects when applied to a complex, nonlinear, and relatively unpredictable ecological, 
social, and economic system that is poorly understood (Holling & Meffe, 1996).  
Another criticism of command and control policies is their tendency to focus on 
achieving short-term goals. To control variation, resource extraction, and function of natural 
ecosystems, the ecological processes inevitably become less resilient to natural and human-
induced disturbances (Knight & Meffe, 1997). Changing circumstances are rarely planned for, 
which can have unforeseen consequences on the natural environment and human well-being.  
Wetland ecosystems are complex landscapes to manage, especially since humans have 
become a crucial component of the system and who have immense control over its trajectory. 
Since a complete understanding of these landscapes has yet to be fully obtained, a hierarchical, 
one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to be effective (Knight & Meffe, 1997). Multiple 
perspectives in the decision-making process may defuse ‘power trips’ and promote the 
replacement of rigid and ineffective policy approaches with innovative solutions (Hahn & 
Stavins, 1991; Sinclair, 1997; Knight & Meffe, 1997). Some critics of command and control 
regulations have advocated for policies based on economic incentives which imply less stringent 
governance over institutions (Sinclair, 1997). However, incentive-based approaches have also 
received criticisms in the monitoring and implementation of conservation targets. These 
incentives will be explored in more detail in the following section on market-based instruments.  
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Due to a vast and complex set of actors influencing the success of the policy, it is quite 
difficult to ‘command’ all the factors by way of law enforcement and financial penalties (Porto 
& Lobato, 2004). Tools that were successful when a limited number of pollutants were released 
from a limited number of sources are inadequate today as society develops and sources of 
wetland degradation become increasingly difficult to control, especially with non-point sources 
(Karp & Gaulding, 1995). Thus, although command and control policies were once the dominant 
policy instrument for environmental management, it has been demonstrated that with greater 
understanding of socio-ecological systems and the continuing development of human society, it 
is no longer considered an adequate policy instrument on its own for addressing large 
environmental issues.  
4.3 Market-Based Instruments 
 Since the 1970s, many countries, most prominently the United States, have adopted 
market-based instruments to address environmental concerns (Robertson, 2006). These policies 
have been viewed more favourably in recent decades than command and control policies, 
especially by environmental economists, because of their ability to address inefficiencies that 
command and control policies lack (Robertson, 2006; Vatn, 2015). Based on conventional 
economic theory, well-functioning markets ensure the most efficient and cost-effective way of 
achieving environmental regulatory requirements (Robertson, 2006). In addition, it is believed 
that a market for ES can ensure consumers using such services have a useful way of measuring, 
in financial terms, the cost of environmental degradation (Costanza et al., 1997; Robertson, 
2006).  
However, some scholars express concern for an economic framework that centers around 
“selling nature to save it” (McAffee, 1999). Some critics of market-based instruments have 
expressed unease about and mistrust for the way market-based instruments view the world from 
a neoliberal perspective since conservation of natural resources are thereby tied to the very forces 
and logics that threaten and destroy the ecosystems to begin with (McAfee, 1999; Van Hecken et 
al., 2015; Kolinjivadi et al., 2019).  
The key principle of market-based instruments is the development of a market that 
ensures voluntary trade among actors over specific goods or services (Vatn, 2015). This is 
different from a command and control policy because, it encourages trade among actors which 
encourages revenue to be reverted back to the industry, thereby creating incentives for 
environmentally sustainable behaviours (Sánchez & Deza, 2015). This is contrasted with a 
command and control policy which may issue permits and collect revenue by a central 
government institution (Sánchez & Deza, 2015).  
 Overall, this type of policy has gained popularity because of the flexibility it provides 
polluters in determining how they pursue environmental sustainability. If it is cheaper for a firm 
to improve their sustainability on their own rather than pay the price of pollution, they can do so. 
Similarly, if the cost of sustainability is more expensive than the price of pollution, they can pay 
that price (Sánchez & Deza, 2015). Another benefit of market-based instruments is their ability 
to promote technological advancements to address environmental degradation (Sánchez & Deza, 
2015). However, when applied to the sustainable use of wetlands, this approach has had 
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difficulties with lax compliance and poor policy design (Robertson, 2006). In this section, 
offsetting, the main market-based tool for addressing wetland degradation, will be evaluated.  
The country that is cited the most for the use of this policy approach is the United States, which 
will be used to discuss this instrument in further detail.  
4.3.1 Section 404 Program 
The implementation of market-based instruments is most prominently demonstrated by 
the United States and its application of a wetland credit market through a regulatory mechanism 
known as Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 1972 (Hough & Robertson, 2009; Clare, 
Krogman, Foote & Lemphers, 2011). Section 404, through a permitting program, seeks to restore 
and maintain the chemical, biological and physical integrity of the country’s waters (Clare et al., 
2011). The program requires the issuance of an Individual Permit for any activity resulting in the 
discharge of fill materials or dredge into American waters, including wetlands (Hough & 
Robertson 2009; Clare et al., 2011).  The authority to approve permits is given to the Army 
Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the EPA (Robertson, 2006; Clare et al., 2011). The Corps has 
responsibility over day-to-day administration of the permit program, issuing permits for projects 
effecting national waters (Robertson, 2006). While the EPA is tasked with developing 
environmental criteria used by the Corps to make decisions about permit approvals (Hough & 
Robertson, 2009). These permits typically require “compensatory mitigation” in the form of 
wetland restoration to balance the effects of wetland loss from proposed projects (Robertson, 
2006). However, this shared enforcement authority between the Corps and the EPA for the 
formation and interpretation of mitigation requirements under Section 404 has proven difficult as 
will be explored in further detail in the discussion of biodiversity offsetting (Hough & 
Robertson, 2009).  
4.3.1.1 Mitigation Sequence 
In 1980, guidelines for the permit program were released and formalized the concept of 
“sequencing” wetland permit decision-making to assist the Section 404 program in preventing 
further habitat loss or damage (Brown & Lant, 1999; Clare et al., 2011). The first step of the 
mitigation sequence is to avoid impacts on wetlands altogether by not taking part in a particular 
act; if a developer can prove that the first step cannot be taken, the next step of the sequence is to 
minimize impacts on the land by limiting the scale of action or implementation; lastly, if all else 
fails, the developer is required to compensate for any damages caused by the proposed project by 
replacing or providing a substitute resource (Brown & Lant, 1999; Hough & Robertson, 2009). 
Thus, the purpose of the wetland mitigation sequence is to restore, create, and enhance wetlands 
for the purpose of providing compensatory mitigation before a permit is approved (Brown & 
Lant, 1999).  
The practice of wetland creation and restoration has been controversial due to the 
uncertainty that lies with defining what is ecologically necessary to properly create and restore 
important and complex wetland ecosystems (Mitsch et al., 1998).  Some ecologists believe there 
is a lack of understanding of proper wetland creation and restoration and, instead, is used as a 
tool by developers to drain and destroy remaining wetlands (Roberts, 1993). This is reinforced 
by the inconsistency of successfully recreated ecological functions of constructed wetlands 
(Mitsch et al., 1998).  
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Although the purpose of the sequence is to avoid damage to wetland ecosystems at all 
cost, it has proven difficult to enforce this first stage of the mitigation sequence (Hough & 
Robertson, 2009). Before a permit can be issued to offset damages (last stage of the sequence) to 
a wetland in favor of a development project under these guidelines, it must be demonstrated that 
there is no other available, feasible, or conservative alternative to the proposed project (Clare et 
al., 2011). This process legally requires developers to abide by a mitigation sequence with clear 
steps that include impact avoidance, impact minimization, or impact compensation, in that order 
(Hough & Robertson, 2009; Clare et al., 2011; Vaissière et al., 2017). However, the threshold for 
each step of the mitigation sequence has failed to be adequately addressed (Hough & Robertson, 
2009).  Permit approvals are typically made on a case-by-case basis, making it difficult to remain 
consistent and ensure environmental protection (Hough & Robertson, 2009).  
Although regulations emphasize avoidance of wetland loss over minimization and 
compensation, the argument can still be made by a developer that no practical alternatives exist 
for a proposed project to avoid impacts due to issues of land ownership or availability, 
geographical scope, economic viability, logistics, or technological feasibility (Clare et al., 2011). 
Additionally, federal agencies have been known to compromise their integrity on permit 
applications so long as it could be shown, at least on paper, no net loss of wetlands is achievable 
(Hough & Robertson, 2009).  This leniency is partly a result of the EPA’s hesitancy to make use 
of Section 404(c), which allows the EPA to veto the Corps’ permits (Hough & Robertson, 2009).  
Therefore, it is broadly acknowledged by scholars, regulators, scientists, policymakers, and the 
regulated community that the first step of the mitigation sequence, avoidance, is ignored more 
often than it is implemented (Hough & Robertson, 2009; Clare et al., 2011).  
The failure to effectively implement the first stage of the mitigation sequence may be 
attributed to the lack of agreement on how to define avoidance (Clare et al., 2011). Avoidance 
could be interpreted in several ways, including the prevention of direct impacts such as filling 
materials into the wetland or an attempt regardless of the outcomes (Clare et al., 2011). 
Therefore, regulators are given a high degree of discretion when interpreting permits for 
approval (Clare et al., 2011) resulting in approvals rarely being denied (Hough & Robertson, 
2009).  
4.3.1.2 No Net Loss Policy 
Further preference for compensation over avoidance in the management of wetlands was 
reinforced in 1989 with the adoption of “no net loss” policy (Clare et al., 2011) which aims to 
achieve no net loss between the gains and losses of ecological functions (Vaissière & Leverel, 
2015). On one hand, some believe that this policy has raised awareness for the issue of wetland 
loss at the national level (Hough & Robertson, 2009). On the other hand, the argument could be 
made that no net loss policy is being used to allow impacts to occur and require compensation 
rather than the denial of permits through the avoidance or minimization stages (Hough & 
Robertson, 2009). As a result, the concept of mitigating damages to wetlands through 
minimization or compensation has gained traction over avoidance (Hough & Robertson, 2009; 
Clare et al., 2011).  
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4.3.2 Biodiversity Offsetting 
 Biodiversity offsetting is a market-based policy tool used to ensure ecological gains that 
counterbalance negative impacts to biodiversity (Calvet, Napoléone & Salles, 2015). The 
concept was initially proposed to offset losses to natural wetlands from development projects by 
constructing man-made marshes to reduce environmental damages (Hough & Robertson, 2009). 
Biodiversity offsetting can be described as measurable conservation outcomes as a result of 
compensating for significant enduring adverse impacts on biodiversity from development 
projects after the first two steps of the mitigation sequence have failed (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, 
Singh & Milder-Gulland, 2013). This gives government regulators the ability to encourage 
companies to contribute to conservation and meet regional conservation goals that are integrated 
into government and business plans (Kiesecker et al., 2009). The ultimate objective of 
biodiversity offsetting is to achieve no net loss or, ideally, net gain of biodiversity with regards to 
habitat structure, species composition, ecosystem function, human use and cultural value 
associated with the biodiversity (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Bull et al., 2013). To achieve 
this, biodiversity offsetting attempts to compromise between economic development and the 
protection of biodiversity (Peimer et al., 2017). It assumes that impacts from development on 
biodiversity can be offset elsewhere, ideally somewhere in proximity of the impacted region, to 
ensure the protection or enhancement of habitat space (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007).   
 Offsetting has been widely adopted despite underdeveloped methodologies and 
conceptual frameworks (Bull et al., 2013). However, it has been advocated for in the political 
spheres because of its combined regulatory approach of a polluter-pays principle and economic 
incentives structure (Calvet et al., 2015). It is believed that this structure can meet biodiversity 
conservation objectives without obstructing economic development (Bull et al., 2013). The 
controversy remains over the need to accept ecological losses in the face of uncertain gains (Bull 
et al., 2013).  
 Since biodiversity offsets represent a significant cost for developers (responsibility, in 
some cases, for ensuring the success of the offset and financial costs of doing so) it is thought to 
provide an incentive to limit a project’s impact on biodiversity, based on the assumption that 
rational actors will weigh economic costs and benefits of decision-making (Calvet et al., 2015). 
When a project is unable to avoid or mitigate impacts to a wetland, offsetting can be used to 
satisfy the compensation step of the mitigation hierarchy. Thus, offsetting has the potential to 
benefit industry by increasing the likelihood that permission is granted for new development 
projects with greater support from the public in a more effective manner that takes environmental 
risks into consideration (Kiesecker et al., 2009).  
However, academics have been wary of the ability to successfully replicate lost 
ecological functions based on evidence from prominent failures (Kentula et al., 1992; Bull et al., 
2013). For example, a development project in Washington County resulted in the offsetting of 
several ponds in Oregon (Kentula et al., 1992).  However, an examination of the newly 
constructed ponds found that these water features were not a typical wetland of the region and 




 Many of the criticisms of wetland offsetting have focused on the lack of evidence that 
demonstrates its ability to meet no net loss goals, especially with regards to the Section 404 
program (Harper & Quigley, 2005), particularly since a majority of approved 404 permits have 
resulted in a net loss of wetlands (Kentula et al., 1992). It is argued that in the best-case scenario, 
in which an offset is protected in perpetuity and supported so the habitat may one day resemble 
the composition and structure of the lost habitat, there is still an initial net loss of habitat 
(Bekessy et al., 2010). This failure to achieve no net loss can be attributed, in part, to the 
ambiguity and undefined parameters of this principle. Offsets can be used to provide 
compensation for lost ES, ecosystem function, biodiversity, or all the above, however it is up to 
the discretion of stakeholders to define the objective of no net loss (Bull et al., 2013). Although it 
is often assumed that the baseline is measured against biodiversity, no net loss measures are 
often undefined (Bull et al., 2013).  
 When offsets are developed in accordance with permit conditions there remains the issue 
of ecological equivalence in the type, location, time, and ecological context of the offset 
(Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Bull et al., 2013). This is the case even if the same type of 
wetland is created, there remains fundamental differences between natural and man-made 
wetlands (Bull et al., 2013). Typically, offsets have been measured based on size alone, which is 
criticized as a very crude approach to monitoring no net loss because of the quality and type of 
habitat (Hough & Robertson, 2009; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). The longevity of the offset is also 
inconsistently implemented, some required to last as long as the impacts of development persist, 
while some are required in perpetuity (Bull et al., 2013). However, even the meaning of 
perpetuity is plagued with ambiguity (Bull et al., 2013). There is also debate over who should be 
responsible for ensuring the successful implementation of the above concerns. The lack of clarity 
of how an offset should be maintained, for how long, and by whom contributes to the lack of 
effectiveness and efficiency of offsetting (Bull et al., 2013).   
 The biggest concern from academics with regards to offsetting is uncertainty of future 
gains (Bekessy et al., 2010; Bull et al., 2013). Especially when there is a considerable lag 
between biodiversity lost and the establishment of an offset (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007). 
Although impacts from development could, in some cases, be reversed through restoration, 
reversibility also remains undefined in objective terms (Bull et al., 2013). Although biodiversity 
offsetting has theoretical potential to address the loss and degradation of wetlands, case studies 
of its application leave many scholars and policy practitioners uncertain of its ability to achieve 
no net loss. 
4.3.3 Payments for Ecosystem Services  
 In addition to biodiversity offsetting, payments for ecosystem services (PES) provides an 
alternative market-based solution to environmental degradation. PES has also been favoured over 
command and control regulation because of its flexibility and ability to address ES providers 
specifically (Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, 2008). Rather than ineffective sanctioning of rule 
violators using punitive measures, PES seeks to resolve developmental and environmental trade-
offs using direct and conditional payments to land managers (also referred to as ES providers) 
(Wunder, 2005; Van Hecken, Bastiaensen & Windey, 2015).  
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Wunder (2005) introduced a definition of PES that was widely adopted. According to this 
definition a PES framework consists of “a voluntary transaction where a well-defined ES (or 
land-use likely to secure that service) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer from a 
(minimum one) ES provider if, and only if, the ES provider secures ES provision 
(conditionality)” (Wunder, 2005, p.2). Conditionality is defined as the ‘business-like principle’ 
to which one will pay only if the service is delivered (Wunder, 2005). This is a crucial and 
distinctive feature of PES programs as it attempts to add value to conservation (Kolinjivadi et al., 
2019).   
Following this definition was much debate over its inclusiveness and appropriate 
wording. It was argued that not all PES programs fit this defined framework (Engel et al., 2008) 
because it excludes numerous PES schemes that operate under different guidelines, with ill-
defined ES or insufficient provision standards (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010). For example, Engel et 
al. (2008) noted several ‘PES-like’ compensation schemes in the tropics that match several 
features of the 2005 definition but do not satisfy all criterion.  It was also argued that this 
framework was primarily based on an environmental economics approach (Wunder, 2005; Engel 
et al., 2008) which is derived from theoretical economic perspectives centered around how 
efficient gains can be achieved by utilizing market forces and providing individual price 
incentives (Van Hecken et al., 2015).  
Wunder (2013) attempted to address these concerns by broadening the term ‘ecosystem 
services’ to ‘environmental services’ that goes beyond services we consider to be of a systemic 
nature. He later altered the PES criteria to: “(1) voluntary transactions (2) between service users 
(3) and service providers (4) that are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management 
(5) for generating offsite services” (Wunder, 2015, p. 241). In response to previous criticisms, 
this new definition acknowledges that most agreements center around resource-use proxies as the 
main performance measure and compliance indicator rather than ES which can be difficult to 
define (Wunder, 2015). In addition, the term ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ was previously criticized for 
being too market driven and was thus replaced with ‘user’ and ‘provider’ to encompass all whom 
an ecosystem buyer and seller would recruit from (Wunder, 2015). Lastly, the fifth criteria 
purposely link the PES framework to the environmental externalities, which the fourth criteria 
seeks to address (Wunder, 2015). This definition recognizes that ES users are typically external 
to the site to which the services are derived and who typically benefit indirectly (Wunder, 2015).  
However, some critics feel the improved definition fails to address the lack of conditionality in 
real-world setups, which is a critical component of PES programs (Hausknost et al., 2017).  
Utilizing an incentive-based market approach, PES emerged in response to the rigidness 
of command and control policies, because of its ability to generate creative tailor-made 
approaches grounded in the belief that rational individuals act based on self-interest (Kolinjivadi, 
Van Hecken, Almeida, Dupras & Kosoy, 2019). PES programs are based on the rationale of 
mainstream economic theory that ES are externalities because they provide benefits for human 
beings which are obtained for free and therefore left out of economic decisions (Kosoy & 
Corbera, 2010). PES assumes that these externalities are a result of market failures, thus if 
individuals were to pay for such services this apparent discrepancy would be addressed (Engel et 
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al. 2008; Muradian et al., 2013; Hausknost, Grima & Singh, 2017). Without such incentives, it is 
assumed that land-users (individuals benefitting from ES) are unmotivated to implement 
environmentally conscious land-use practices (Engel et al., 2008; Kolinjivadi et al., 2019).  
PES has emerged as a tool for integrating ES into economic systems by establishing a 
mechanism for suppliers (landowners) of ES to be compensated for their continued delivery 
(Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Van Hecken et al., 2015; Bennett & Gosnell, 2015; 
Hausknost et al., 2017). Such services include provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting 
(Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013), all of which are supplied in some form by wetlands. As a result, 
PES programs are being endorsed around the world to incentivize sustainable management of 
various ES (Bennett & Gosnell, 2015). This includes international organization such as 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and The 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity which brought the concept of ES to the forefront of 
international initiatives (Grima et al., 2016; Hausknost, Grima & Singh, 2017). 
PES frameworks assume that ecosystem managers (e.g. farmers, loggers, and protected 
area managers) are typically inadequately compensated for conservational land use practices and 
the benefits they receive from alternative land uses (e.g. conversion to cropland) often outweigh 
those received from conservation (Engel et al., 2008). However, deforestation can result in 
negative effects to downstream populations whose access to ES such as water filtration are 
negatively impacted (Engel et al., 2008). Since the cost of environmentally harmful practices 
effecting ES users can be greater than the land manager’s opportunity cost, it follows that 
payments by users could incentivize the land manager to adopt conservational land use practices 
(Engel et al., 2008; Van Hecken et al., 2015). By emphasizing positive externalities, PES moves 
away from the commonly applied “polluter pays principle” towards a “beneficiary pays 
principle” (Van Hecken et al., 2015).  
 PES programs are typically developed in economic, social, and environmental contexts 
that are influenced by several stakeholders (Engel et al., 2008). However, the likelihood of 
successful implementation has been demonstrated in several studies showing that the benefits for 
households and communities of environmental service markets can be realized and heightened 
through information dissemination (Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013). In helping realize these 
benefits, which are often provided over a long period of time, the only way to demonstrate its 
effect is by comparing it to its counterfactual baseline, which is the result of no intervention 
(Wunder, 2005).  
 Payments are typically made in cash or through other in-kind benefits (Wunder, 2005) 
such as special recognition of indigenous or local rights to natural resources, health and 
education facilities for the local community, initiatives towards improving welfare, or the 
improvement of social services (Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013). PES schemes are ideally based on 
output payments that are made on the basis of the ES provided under the agreement (Engel et al., 
2008). However, since many ES are difficult to directly observe (especially cultural services), 
input-based payments are used more often, which attaches payments to particular land uses on a 
per-hectare basis (Engel et al., 2008). Whatever form payments take, it must exceed any 
additional benefit the ecosystem manager would have received from alternative land practices 
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but at a price ES users are willing to pay (Engel et al., 2008). Input-based programs typically 
monitor to ensure (i) that ecosystem providers are complying with their contracted agreement 
through specified land uses, and, in some cases, (ii) whether the land uses are resulting in the 
desired effect (Engel et al., 2008).  
Buyers of these programs are typically either direct users of the ES or is an agency 
(typically an NGO or government entity) acting on behalf of the users (Engel et al., 2008). 
Sellers are then individuals who have the ability to ensure the protection and delivery of the ES, 
typically landholders (Engel et al., 2008). Regardless of who the sellers are, the goal of PES 
frameworks is to utilize knowledge of ES provision and seek providers at the lowest cost (Engel 
et al., 2008). Most ecosystems provide a number of services; therefore, efforts are sometimes 
made to sell ‘bundled’ services or ‘layer’ payments from several users towards payments to 
providers (Engel et al., 2008; de Groot et al., 2012). An ES can only be considered as such if it is 
perceived to be a benefit to human beings and is a socially viable product of nature, although it 
has yet to be determined how such validation is required (Kolinjivadi et al., 2019). 
It is not necessary to use valuation techniques to determine a price for ES provided under 
PES, although it might be a helpful tool in PES design (Wunder, 2013). Instead, cost can be 
determined through negotiations or proposed costs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis between users 
and providers (Wunder, 2013). It should be noted that due to a great deal of uncertainty and 
disconnect between sustainable land use practices and associated ecological effects, a user’s 
willingness to pay (WTP) is likely to increase if an established link is made between the land 
uses and the environmental outcomes (Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013). In addition, there will only 
be payments for ES that are deemed valuable and the users’ WTP exceeds the sellers’ 
willingness to accept (WTA) (Van Hecken et al., 2015). Therefore, if the economics between 
WTP and WTA do not square up, there is no grounds for PES (Wunder, 2013).  
Wunder (2008) observes that ES beneficiaries (users) frequently hold a stronger 
negotiating position because there are typically fewer of them, therefore creating a higher 
demand, and they are generally better informed than ES providers. Even if poor ES providers 
become better off as a result of a PES program, questions remain about how much and in what 
form this will occur (Wunder, 2008). This is because with any commercial transaction, there is 
an inherent struggle over the buyers’ desire to maximize surplus (conservation gains) and the 
sellers’ desire to maximize their income, therefore equitable PES arrangements will greatly 
depend on the negotiating power between both parties (Wunder, 2008). If the users’ WTP and 
providers’ WTA do not align there will be no grounds for PES. In other words, if the potential 
profits of alternative land uses (e.g. land development) are too high, service users will be ill-
equipped to sufficiently compensate landowners to pursue conservation practices (Wunder, 
2013; Muradian et al., 2013).  
PES is only successful in regions with the right culture that understands the need for 
service users to pay and for providers to be motivated by payments to ensure the delivery of such 
services (Wunder, 2013). For example, Wunder (2013) finds that few irrigating farmers are 
willing to pay for watershed services despite being relatively wealthy and a predominant 
resource user which may be attributed to the cultural perspective of free water rights in the past. 
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However, even if payments are made it is not guaranteed that social and ethical behaviours will 
improve and, in some cases, this may even undermine genuine intentions (Muradian et al., 2013). 
This may result in ‘leakage’ which refers to the displacement of activities harmful to an ES to 
other areas outside the geographical region protected under PES (Engel et al., 2008; Von Thaden 
et al., 2019). If this occurs, environmental benefits derived from PES may be miscalculated 
(Engel et al., 2008). Grima et al. (2016) identify four major takeaways of successful PES 
programs in Latin America. This includes the importance of (1) continued provisioning of 
critical resources while contributing positively to local livelihoods, (2) local and regional level 
programs ranging between 10-30 years, (3) the use of in-kind contributions rather than only cash 
payments, and (4) the dominance of private actors with few intermediaries between buyers and 
sellers.  
 Critics of PES argue that the framework is not interested in saving nature but rather 
creating markets to operate in (Van Hecken et al., 2015). Reinforcing this perception, Kosoy and 
Corbera (2010) argue that PES reflects a ‘commodity fetishism’ that strips ecosystem values 
down to a single measure, thereby obscuring their social relations. It has been argued by several 
scholars that the creation of a market will ultimately favour the economically and socially 
powerful, resulting in hardships for the poor (McAfee, 1999; Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; Muradian 
et al., 2013). This has been expressed in some cases in which receivers of payments (providers) 
are significantly wealthier than the local users of such services, therefore raising equity concerns 
(Muradian et al., 2013). Many criticisms of PES are similar to those of valuation as discussed in 
Chapter 2, expressing concerns such as the potential to mask the complexity of critical processes 
underlying ES production (Gomez-Baggethun & Ruiz-Perez, 2011) or selling out nature 
(McAfee, 1999; O’Niell & Spash, 2000; McCauley, 2006).  
PES have been used for the protection of many types of ES in several countries at 
different levels of government. To demonstrate its relevance to the ES provided by wetlands, 
Manitoba, Canada’s Alternative Land Use Services (ALUS) program will be explored in the 
following section.  
4.3.3.1 Manitoba’s ALUS Program 
 Unfortunately, little research has been done covering PES schemes in Canada. However, 
there is evidence that they have been successfully implemented at the local level. This has been 
demonstrated by the municipality of Blanshard, Manitoba, Canada and its Alternative Land Use 
Services (ALUS) program from 2006 to 2008, which targeted environmental stewardship in 
agricultural development (Mann, Grant & Kulshreshtha, 2014; France & Campbell, 2015). 
Throughout the duration of the program, the community and farmers displayed tremendous 
support with over 8,000 ha of wetlands, native prairie, and riparian areas involved (France & 
Campbell, 2015). The program was supported by many organizations including Delta Waterfowl, 
the Manitoba Rural Adaptation Council, duck stamp funds from several U.S states, the local 
government, and in-kind support from the Little Saskatchewan River Conservation District 
(France & Campbell, 2015). Annual payments were allocated on a per-acre basis at $15.00, 
$7.50, and $5.00 in exchange for forgoing agricultural use, haying and grazing (Mann et al., 
2014). Although compensation was modest, farmers reported receiving enough support to cover 
33 
 
their property tax, which they considered more-than-adequate compensation (France & 
Campbell, 2015).  
 The program was deemed a success because of its ability to attract both environmentally 
conscious farmers who were already undertaking similar practices and farmers who required 
financial incentive (France & Campbell, 2015). However, the program was not without some 
criticism. Two major points of criticism were the emphasis on historical loss rather than 
continued sources of degradation of wetlands, resulting in a focus of creating new as opposed to 
protecting existing ecosystems (France & Campbell, 2015) and, second, some participants 
reported inconsistent monitoring standards which resulted in some farmers being ineligible for 
payment (France & Campbell, 2015). Despite these criticisms the overall success of the program 
encouraged the expansion of PES programs into Norfolk, Ontario and a province wide program 
in Prince Edward Island (France & Campbell, 2015).  
 This chapter has demonstrated that there are several policy approaches to the 
management of wetlands, each with their own set of solutions and criticisms. The following 
chapter will explore the evolution of wetland policy in Canada and Ontario with an assessment 
of the policy approach utilized.    
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Chapter 5: Wetland Policy in Canada 
5.1 Wetland Policy in Canada 
 Since Canada joined the Ramsar Convention, several steps have been taken at the federal 
level to address the need for wise use and management of wetlands.  The development of 
wetland policy and legislation in Canada has predominantly focused on wetland functions that 
Canadians receive a direct financial benefit from, such as flood damage reduction, water quality, 
resource harvesting, and recreational activities, with functions that are valued at over $10 billion 
CAD annually (Rubec, 1994). However, as a result of the division of powers outlined in the 
Constitution Act of 1867, the governance of wetlands is not allocated to a single government 
body across the country, rather it varies depending on provincial jurisdiction (Austen & Hanson, 
2007). The management of natural resources, such as wetlands, are generally governed by the 
provinces, while the federal government is responsible for only 29 per cent of wetlands in the 
country, which lie within federal lands such as military reserves, National Wildlife Areas, 
National Parks, and land in the northern territories (Rubec & Hanson, 2009). Although wetlands 
are predominately governed by the provinces, a brief survey of Canada’s approach to wetland 
management will be explored first followed by an in-depth discussion of Ontario’s policy 
approach in light of the command and control discussion outlined above. 
Federal authority is grounded in its responsibility to maintain the quality of the 
environment, inland and ocean fisheries, migratory bird populations, international and 
transboundary resources, and federal land holdings (Lynch-Stewart, Kessel-Tarylor & Rubec, 
1999). Therefore, the conservation and management of natural habitats and biodiversity 
primarily depends on the provinces. As a result, statutes related to land-use planning, wildlife 
management, water management, environmental assessment, sustainable use of resources, 
private land conservation and the designation of protected areas have been established but none 
of which exclusively deal with wetland protection (Lynch-Stewart et al., 1999). In addition, 
municipalities can also impact and regulate wetlands with land use plans, zoning by-laws, 
building regulations and site plan controls (Bond et al., 1992).  
5.1.1 Ramsar Convention 
 One of the decisions driving a federal wetland policy was Canada’s membership in the 
Ramsar Convention, effective as of 1981, and the concomitant commitment to the wise use of 
wetlands, including the designation of wetlands of international importance and ensuring the 
present and future conservation of their resources (Lynch-Stewart et al., 1999; Schulte-Hostedde, 
Walters, Powell, Shrubsole, 2007). As of 2019, Canada has designated 37 wetlands of 
international significance, 9 of which are located in Ontario (Ramsar, 2014). However, most 
wetlands in Canada are not identified under the Ramsar Convention nor are they within federal 
jurisdiction to designate (Schulte-Hostedde et al., 2007).   
5.1.2 North American Wetland Management Plan 
 The North American Wetland Management Plan (NAWMP) of 1986 was signed by 
Canada and the United States (and later endorsed by Mexico) and focuses on the rejuvenation of 
waterfowl and other wildlife populations through the conservation of uplands and wetlands by 
utilizing partnership plans, projects and programs (Lynch-Stewart, Rubec, Cox & Patterson, 
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1993). To promote coordination among countries, the North American Wetland Conservation 
Council (NAWCC) was established in 1990 to implement the NAWMP (Rubec, 1994). The 
multilateral program sought to invest over $1.5 billion in wetland conservation and management 
in Canada, resulting in the securing of more than 830,000 hectares of upland and wetland habitat 
(Rubec, 1994).  
5.1.3 Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation  
 The Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (FPWC) in 1991 was later developed to 
compliment the Ramsar Convention, NAWMP and several other wetland related policies 
(Government of Canada, 1991) to outline the goals, objectives, and guiding principles to 
conserve and manage wetlands on federal lands, involving federal departments or programs that 
require federal funding (Cox, 1997; Loftus, Smardon & Potter, 2004). The FPWC is an 
overarching policy and requires all federal departments to sustain wetland functions in the 
development of new policies and programs (Rubec & Hanson, 2009). This includes policies that 
promote and sustain ecological and socio-economic functions of wetlands now and in the future 
(Government of Canada, 1991; Lynch-Stewart et al., 1993). It outlines seven strategies for the 
wise use and management of Canadian wetlands and the delivery of effective wetland science 
and public awareness among the national and international community (Rubec, 1994). However, 
it should be noted that the FPWC focuses on performance objectives rather than on prohibitions 
and regulations of activities (Rubec & Hanson, 2009). 
Two major goals of the FPWC are to ensure that there is no net loss of wetland functions 
on federal land and waters and to encourage the rehabilitation and enhancement of wetlands 
where wetland functions have reached critical levels (Loftus et al., 2004). To achieve these goals, 
Canada emphasizes the mitigation sequence, although it has been criticized as being ineffective 
at achieving no net loss (Austen & Hanson, 2007). The first two stages of the mitigation 
sequence (avoidance and minimization) were initially given the most effort during the early 
years of the FPWC, but compensation was thought to be a necessary component of the sequence 
in order to prevent net loss of wetland functions (Rubec & Hanson, 2009). However, there 
remains no formula in place to objectively determine how much one should compensate, and 
requirements are typically decided on a case-by-case basis, making a standardized national 
mitigation sequence difficult to achieve (Rubec & Hanson, 2009).  
5.2 Ontario’s Wetlands 
 Ontario accounts for roughly 25 per cent of Canada’s wetlands and about 6 per cent of all 
the wetlands globally, covering more than 350,000 km2 mostly found in the northern region of 
the province (Ontario Government, 2017). However, despite this large land cover, it is only a 
fraction of what once was. It is estimated that more than three-quarters of the wetlands that were 
found in Ontario pre-colonization have been lost in southern Ontario (below the Canadian 
Shield) due to land clearing, dredging and filling, drainage, and other land uses (Lynch-Stewart 
et al., 1993). Ontario has implemented both policy and legislation, predominantly through the 
provincial Planning Act (1990) by governing land use plans to address conservation and 
management of internationally and provincially significant wetlands (Rubec, 1994). Although 
Ontario does not have legislation specifically directed at wetland management and conservation, 
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a number of policies and legislation are used that either address wetlands specifically or can be 
used more broadly (Loftus et al., 2004).  
Since the 1980s, Ontario has incrementally developed an approach to wetland 
management, beginning with the development of the Ontario Wetland Evaluation System 
(OWES) (Schulte-Hostedde et al., 2007) in the Provincial Policy Statement under Section 3 of 
the Planning Act (Stadel et al., 1993). The goals of Section 3 are to (1) identify and protect 
wetlands sufficiently through a land use planning process; and (2) to ensure no loss of 
provincially significant wetlands (Schulte-Hostedde & Shrubsole, 2003).  
5.2.1 Ontario Wetland Evaluation System  
 The Ontario Planning Act was implemented in 1947 to establish procedures and authority 
for decision-making and guide local governments around land use changes on both private and 
municipal land (Schulte-Hostedde & Shrubsole, 2003). It was not until the 1980s, when the 
public became more aware and appreciative of environmental values, that amendments to the 
Planning Act took place to protect natural resources (Schulte-Hostedde & Shrubsole, 2003).  
The 1982 Planning Act emphasized municipal responsibility through official plans, 
subdivision control, zoning by-laws and several other tools to reinforce its objectives (Schulte-
Hostedde & Shrubsole, 2003). In 1984, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources established 
the OWES to objectively classify significant wetlands in a standardized procedure (Schulte-
Hostedde et al., 2007) with the goal of protecting all provincially significant wetlands (PSWs) 
(Lynch-Stewart et al., 1993). OWES categorizes wetlands into the four common wetland 
ecosystems in Ontario – marsh, swamp, bog and fens – as determined by the field evaluator on 
the basis of major plant associations and physical, substrate and hydrological information 
obtained in the wetland and immediate surroundings (McKenna, December 11, 2017).  
A wetland is classified based on their social, biological, hydrological and special features, 
each category with the ability to score a total of 250 points (Schulte-Hostedde & Shrubsole, 
2003; Schulte-Hostedde et al., 2007). The biological component considers that wetlands vary in 
terms of productivity and habitat diversity (Ontario Government, 2017). The social component 
measures some of the direct benefits to humans, including marketed products (e.g. wild rice, 
commercial fish, and furbearers), recreational and educational uses (Ontario Government, 2017), 
and Aboriginal and cultural heritage values (Government of Ontario, 2013). The hydrological 
component characterizes water-related benefits such as natural storage capacity, flood mitigation, 
protection against erosion, contributions to groundwater recharge and discharge, and 
improvements to water quality (Ontario Government, 2017). Lastly, the special features 
component considers geographic rarity of the type of wetland, the presence of rare plant and 
animal species, age of the ecosystem, and habitat quality for land and aquatic wildlife (Ontario 
Government, 2017). Therefore, the OWES identifies and considers the various ecosystem 
services provided by wetlands in its approach to wetland management.  
If a wetland unit scores at least 600 points or 200 points in the biological or special 
features categories the wetland is classified as a PSW (Schulte-Hostedde & Shrubsole, 2003; 
Schulte-Hostedde et al., 2007). Once a wetland or area of wetlands (known as a wetland 
37 
 
complex) has been identified, it then gains protective status under the Planning Act and 
Provincial Policy Statement. OWES intentionally ignores the level of disturbance to a wetland 
and focuses on the state that it is currently in at the time of the evaluation and the type of 
ecosystem functions and services that are being generated (McKenna, December 11, 2017). 
Although it has been criticized as a frustrating and inefficient method for developers and land 
use practitioners, the OWES does not categorize individual wetlands into separate wetland 
pockets. Rather, wetlands in proximity are often complexed together because of their related 
biological, social, or hydrological functions (McKenna, December 11, 2017). The OWES takes 
into consideration that, in some cases, wildlife in the area of the complex may variably depend 
on the presence of the entire complex of wetlands, each wetland contributing to the whole 
(McKenna, December 11, 2017). 
The OWES approach to wetland management has been criticized for prioritizing the 
protection of the most ‘valuable’ wetlands (Schulte-Hostedde et al., 2007) by granting some 
protective status while others remain unprotected. On the opposite side, some evaluation 
practitioners have criticized and expressed a lack of clarity and robustness in the evaluation 
system (Savanta Inc., n.d). This includes the variability of complexing groups of small wetlands, 
the potential to undermine the ability to identify the relative importance of a wetland in terms of 
features and functions over others, and the need to modernize OWES to include more recent 
scientific assessments (Savanta Inc., n.d).  
It could be argued that the OWES approach has been largely successful at protecting 
wetlands as the rate of wetland loss in Southern Ontario has been reduced to less than 2 per cent 
(Ontario Government, 2017). However, this figure falls short of Ontario’s 2025 goal to halt net 
loss of wetlands and the 2030 goal of achieving a net gain in wetland area and function (Ontario 
Government, 2017). Those classified as PSWs are supposed to be protected from negative 
impacts to the natural features or ecological functions (Provincial Policy Statement, 2014), 
however evidence has shown that some attempts have failed to fully protect their ecological 
functions (Stadel et al., 1993), thereby placing in question the effectiveness of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms.  
5.2.2 Provincial Policy Statement  
 The Provincial Policy Statement (PPS) was first released in 1996 under the authority of 
the Planning Act between the Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MMA) and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Forestry (MNRF) (Lynch-Stewart et al., 1993), which includes policy areas such 
as natural heritage and specific wetland policies (Loftus et al., 2004).  Its goal is to provide 
direction on land use planning and development that are of provincial interest (Loftus et al., 
2004). Currently, under Section 3 of the Planning Act, 2008, the PPS (2014) prohibits 
development and site alteration on significant wetlands and significant coastal wetlands unless 
no negative impacts to the natural features or ecological functions have been demonstrated 
(Provincial Policy Statement, 2014). This principle also applies to adjacent lands unless no 
negative impacts to the natural features or functions of the PSW can be demonstrated (Provincial 
Policy Statement, 2014).  
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However, the PPS has been criticized for its exemption of agricultural practices such as 
peat harvesting and drainage, which is not considered ‘development’ (Lynch-Stewart et al., 
1999; Schulte-Hostedde et al., 2007). Through a review period of the PPS that occurs every 5 
years, the PPS has addressed shortcomings to its initial focus on development by establishing a 
need to prove that no negative impacts will occur as a result of development and to ensure 
decisions are consistent with the goals of the PPS (Schulte-Hostedde et al., 2007). However, 
despite these amendments, critics point out areas of concern such as fragmented jurisdictions, 
financial arrangements, enforcement, and informed decision-making (Schulte-Hostedde et al., 
2007).  
The Ontario government relies on top-down control, through the Planning Act, over the 
processes affecting wetlands by establishing restrictions to activities on or near PSWs. In order 
to achieve the desired behaviour, Ontario uses a command and control approach that relies on 
law to outline prohibited behaviours and police enforcement to induce compliance with the 
application of penalties. This reinforces a command and control mandate by assuming 
environmental wrongdoers should compensate society by paying the cost of damages to PSWs 
through penal means. However, scholars such as Knight and Meffe (1997) caution that due to the 
lack of understanding of wetland ecosystems, a hierarchical, one size fits all approach is unlikely 
to be effective in the long-term. As was demonstrated in the example of the Clean Water Act in 
the previous chapter, the increasing array of direct and indirect threats to natural resources pose 
challenges for command and control policies.  
5.2.3 Conservation Authorities  
 Conservation authorities are unique to Ontario in that they are corporations with a degree 
of autonomy from provincial and municipal governments (Lysyk, 2018) that represent local 
watershed management agencies that deliver programs and services with the purpose of 
protecting and managing impacts to water and other natural resources (Conservation Ontario, 
n.d). While other jurisdictions manage their natural resources between provincial and municipal 
governments, Ontario began this form of governance in the 1940s in response to severe flooding 
and erosion problems across Ontario (Conservation Ontario, n.d). In 1946, the Conservation 
Authorities Act was passed to establish a legislative framework for the funding and operation of 
conservation authorities across the province (Lysyk, 2018). A conservation authority’s mandate, 
according to the Conservation Authorities Act, is “to provide for the organization and delivery of 
programs and services that further the conservation, restoration, development and management 
of natural resources in watersheds in Ontario” (Conservation Authorities Act, 1990).  
Each conservation authority’s boundaries are determined by the watershed it resides on 
(Lysyk, 2018). A watershed is an area of land that channels precipitation into a common body of 
water such as a lake, river, stream, or marsh (Lysyk, 2018). The rationale for this watershed-
based approach is to provide a meaningful scale to address local needs by considering how one 
part of a watershed may affect downstream communities that cross municipal boundaries (Lysyk, 
2018).  
 Currently, there are thirty-six conservation authorities in the province (Conservation 
Ontario, n.d) that govern approximately 90 per cent of Ontario’s population (Lysyk, 2018). Each 
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has its own Board of Directors comprised of members, most of which are elected municipal 
officials, appointed by local municipalities (Conservation Ontario, n.d).  
 The conservation authority relevant to this case study is the Niagara Peninsula 
Conservation Authority (NPCA), which was established in 1959 and serves the entire Niagara 
Region. The Region is made up of twelve municipalities: 21 per cent of the City of Hamilton and 
25 per cent of Haldimand County (Lysyk, 2018). It manages over 2,400km2 of land, 
approximately 64 per cent of which is used for agricultural activities, 21 percent in a natural 
state, and 15 per cent urbanized (Lysyk, 2018).  
 This chapter has served as a review and assessment of Canada and Ontario’s approach to 
wetland management. Despite a decentralized management approach among the Ontario 
government, conservation authorities, and local governments, the province utilizes a top-down 
command and control style. As outlined in the previous chapter, command and control policies 
encounter issues of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the management of wetlands, making 
them vulnerable to criticisms. The following chapter will introduce the purpose of the social 
multi-criteria evaluation, the methodology used for the case study, and review each step of the 




Chapter 6: Methodology  
A case study of a threatened PSW in the City of Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada was 
chosen to showcase the common conflict between sustainable wetland management and 
economic development in the province. Due to the enviro-political nature of the conflict, a 
SMCE framework was chosen to inform the potential management options of the property. 
Although the PSW resides on private property, stakeholders from the local community were 
invited to participate in the study to gain a deeper understanding of the conflict and implications 
of different management options on various societal groups.  
Figure 1 demonstrates how the conceptual framework of a SMCE was used to address 
this conflict. Whether it is environmental, social, or economic, stakeholders were chosen based 
on their common interest in maximizing the utility of the property. Based on discussions with 
members of each stakeholder group, a list of criteria was developed in addition to a short list of 
management options that are deemed acceptable to the participants. The value of including 
various stakeholder groups is demonstrated in the following sections of the SMCE process. 
 
Figure 1 SMCE Conceptual Framework  
6.1 Scoping 
6.1.1 Legal Analysis 
 To gain a deeper understanding of the issue at hand, a legal analysis was conducted to 
survey relevant policies to the protection of wetlands in Ontario.  Policies included provincial 
legislation and municipal by-laws, in addition to City Council meeting minutes and email 
correspondences obtained through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests by concerned citizens. 
This analysis was used to understand the legal framework to which decisions at the local level 
were made upon and to inform the rationale for decisions at the local level as they evolved 
throughout the duration of the conflict.  
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6.1.2 Stakeholder Analysis  
Information was gathered through ethics cleared interviews with local stakeholders to 
inform each step of the SMCE process. To identify relevant stakeholders involved, a stakeholder 
analysis was conducted simultaneously with a historical analysis. Stakeholders were chosen 
based on their common interest in the property and the knowledge they possessed of the conflict. 
Individuals were initially identified based on their professional positions or reputation 
surrounding the issue in local newspaper articles and city council meeting minutes. Due to the 
high-profile nature of the case in the Niagara Region, several activists were identified as key 
stakeholders. Contact with these individuals were initially made through a professional contact 
of the research team who made introductions via e-mail. A snowball technique was then used to 
identify other stakeholders in their network that were not mentioned in the literature. This led to 
discussions with representatives from various groups such as the private landowner, indigenous 
community, city council, scientific experts, planners, and concerned citizens. These groups 
included individuals who have been a part of the decision-making process as well as those 
typically excluded but take an active role in raising awareness of the issue.   
As a result of the diverse backgrounds and perspectives on the issue, a comprehensive 
understanding was developed in addition to the formal and informal relationships amongst 
various actors. Stakeholders were not meant to be representative of members of an organization 
or community in a way that statistical sampling would. Rather, stakeholders were individuals 
who were privy to the events surrounding the conflict of the PSW and were able to provide 
reliable information about the community and the knowledge that came from their experiences.   
6.1.3 Historical Analysis 
 A total of nine individuals participated in the study. Participants were asked to be 
prepared to partake in two semi-structured interviews. The first interview was to inform the 
historical analysis and develop a list of options and criteria. The second interview involved an 
interactive process of weighing and scoring the options and criteria developed in combination 
with all the initial interviews. However, a total of sixteen interviews were conducted because two 
participants were unavailable for their second interview.  
The first interview, which participants were informed would last about two hours, would 
be used to understand the conflict from their perspective and to generate a list of options and 
criteria used for the SMCE. In this interview, participants were asked how they learned about the 
proposed development project, how they are associated with the land, how they have been 
involved in the issue, and the events that led up to the conflict.   
After surveying the legal mechanisms for wetland management in Ontario, conducting 
initial interviews with participants, reviewing materials gained through FOI requests, and 
assessing reports and air photos of the property, a deeper understanding of the conflict was 
developed. The information gathered was then used to inform conflicts among active participants 
in addition to the complex and uncertain nature of in the decision-making process with regards to 
natural resources.  
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6.2 Options and Criteria 
Initial interviews with participants were used to identify the specific benefits that were 
recognized and used by participants on the property and its wetlands to inform the decision-
making criteria. Questions were asked such as, in what ways does the property support your life, 
what benefits do you receive from the property, and what benefits do you think development 
would bring to your life.  
The discussion of ES proved challenging for some participants who were not familiar 
with the concept, especially since most participants did not have firsthand contact with the ES 
and often reiterated knowledge they had heard from others (e.g. carbon sequestration, flood 
mitigation, and temperature regulation). Additionally, because the property is privately owned, 
direct interaction with the ES was limited and a result of trespassing. However, after further 
explanation and discussion of ES generally, all participants were able to identify ES provided by 
the property in some form or another. Participants described many ES and general aspirations for 
the future of the Niagara Region as it related to the property and were largely reflected in 
decision-making criteria.  
6.3 Weighting and Scoring  
In the SMCE process, an interdisciplinary discussion about the assumptions of impacts 
by various stakeholders plays an active and important role to encourage open dialogue. However, 
rather than conducting this step in a single, interdisciplinary workshop discussion, as typically 
seen with this analysis, individual assessments were completed and compared. The reason for 
this is due to the lack of resources available for the research project. Funding was not available to 
compensate participants for their time away from their professional and personal responsibilities 
to allow for a full-day workshop.  
Additionally, since the conflict had been an ongoing concern for the past five years, 
almost all individuals involved in the study knew of or had previous interactions with each other. 
Some individuals distinctly expressed animosity and distrust towards others involved. Therefore, 
individual evaluations with each participant were conducted in order to reduce the amount of 
time required to complete the evaluation and to avoid stalemate discussions, as predicted by 
several participants based on experiences from Open House meetings hosted at Niagara Falls 
City Hall. It should also be noted that the sample of participants is heavily influenced towards 
opinions and preferences against development. Since the conflict in Niagara Falls has been 
greatly publicized in local media, participants against the development project were more likely 
to want to be involved in the study than those in favour of development.  
The second interview, which participants were informed would last anywhere between 
fifteen minutes to an hour, was used to evaluate the options and criteria previously developed. 
Participants were shown the categorized evaluation criteria and options and were asked to 
complete a two-step evaluation. The first step of the evaluation was to weigh each option to each 
criterion. This was done by comparing each option on either side of a scale ranging from -9 to 
+9. Participants were asked to indicate, using the numerical scale, the expected outcome of the 
evaluating criteria if only two options were being considered. Participants were told that a 
negative indication has not representative of an undesirable outcome, rather an indication 
43 
 
towards either side of 0 would suggest a preference towards the option indicated on that side of 
the scale. Participants were told that a 0 indicated that the options being compared would have 
the exact same effect on the criteria being evaluated. If the participant felt that this was not the 
case, they were to indicate how much, using the numerical scale, the favourable option would 
accommodate for the criteria.  
For the second step of the evaluation, participants were asked to use the same scale to 
indicate the degree of importance, in their opinion, each criterion held when compared to each 
other. The spreadsheets on which each evaluation was conducted with each participant were kept 
separate and coded to ensure anonymity of all participants. A sample of both steps of this 
interview is shown in Appendix A.  
6.3.1 Informing the Impact Matrix 
 OPTamos, the decision-making tool used for this evaluation, translates the weights 
(preferences) into a numerical scale to ensure consistency and uniformity among criteria which 
may have different units of measure. For example, biodiversity may be measured by the 
population size of various species while economic growth may be measured by the number of 
jobs created. This is why participants were asked to use the 19-point scale, to accommodate for 
this feature in OPTamos. Although OPTamos is an open source tool, all data was coded and 
locked in a password protected account to ensure anonymity.  
 Singh et al. (2016) note that in the development of similar analyses, an acceptable value 
of inconsistency is ≤0.1. If the value remains below 0.1, it means that the answers provided by 
participants remain unchanged regardless of how the question was framed. However, many 
answers provided by participants resulted in an inconsistency ratio above this value as shown in 
Table 1. Based on observations of participants completing the evaluation, it appeared as if some 
held onto biases in favour and against certain options. For example, one participant (A2) 
demonstrated extreme preference for any option other than Development as Planned despite the 
criteria being evaluated. Another participant (P1) would argue that Alternate Development would 
likely ensure a better job of safely guiding human interaction with the natural environment than 
Conservation. It was then argued that Conservation was better than Development as Planned. But 
when asked to compare Development as Planned and Alternate Development, they were 
considered to have the same impact, thereby contradicting the statements previously made. 
Therefore, the high rate of inconsistently should be considered when interpreting the results of 
the evaluation.  
Due to the relative inconsistency of the answers provided, it would appear that most 
participants do not feel they have a strong understanding of the impacts to the selected criteria by 
each option. This may be due to the abstract and intangible nature of the criteria. Therefore, the 
answers given by all participants should not be taken to be generalizable since several answers 




Table 1 Inconsistency Ratios 
 Participants were then asked to evaluate the criteria against one another to indicate the 
relative importance from their perspective. This was a difficult task for many participants as they 
were forced to consider the personal preference of conflicting and complementary criteria. For 
example, many participants found education to be closely tied to cultural identity, often claiming 
one fed into the other. While Economic Development and Environmental Sustainability were 
often identified as opposing criteria.  
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 A sensitivity analysis was conducted after each evaluation to determine whether the 
results are affected by a change in the weights. This was done using the sensitivity analysis 
feature in OPTamos and observing how a change in the ranking of options may be associated 
with a loss of overall benefit.  
  
Criteria A1 S2 P1 A2 I1 S1 D1
Environmental Sustainability 0.22 0.44 0.24 0.48 0.53 0.05 0.43
Safe interaction with nature 0.32 0.19 1.65 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.00
Cultural Identity 0.12 0.05 0.25 0.53 0.32 0.01 0.00
Education 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.53 0.19 0.06 0.00
Economic growth 0.47 0.01 0.06 0.53 0.25 0.32 0.00
Inconsistency Ratio per Participant (≤0.1)
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Chapter 7: Scoping Results 
7.1 Legal Analysis 
 Since Ontario does not have a policy directly addressing wetland management, an in-
depth survey of relevant policies at the provincial and local level was conducted as it pertains to 
the City of Niagara Falls (see Appendix B).  The PPS (2014), under the Planning Act (1990), 
provides the highest level of direction for the management and protection of wetlands in the 
province since decisions made by a conservation authority, City and Region must be consistent 
with these policies. The PPS prohibits development and site alteration in significant wetlands and 
adjacent lands in the ecoregion of Southern Ontario, unless it has been demonstrated that no 
negative impacts to the natural features or ecological functions will occur (Provincial Policy 
Statement, 2014). This also applies to habitat of endangered and threated species unless it is in 
accordance with federal and provincial requirements (Provincial Policy Statement, 2014). The 
Conservation Authorities Act (1990) also prohibits activities that interfere with a wetland unless 
a regulation allows it (Conservation Authorities Act, 1990). The PPS does not make any mention 
of achieving no net loss; however, this is discussed in the Wetland Conservation Strategy for 
Ontario 2017-2030 in which wetland offsetting policies are discussed while abiding by the 
mitigation sequence. However, the Strategy mentions that some sites, features and habitats, such 
as PSWs protected by the 2014 PPS, will be ineligible for offsetting based on their status 
(Ontario Government, 2017). Therefore, provincial policies are clear that negative impacts to 
provincially significant wetlands are to be avoided in their entirety.  
The PPS remains relatively silent on the issue of buffer zones between wetlands and 
development practices. The only mention of buffer zones occurs when addressing major facilities 
and sensitive land uses, stating that they should be planned to ensure they are buffered to prevent 
or mitigate adverse effects such as noise, contaminants, minimize risk to public health, and 
ensure long-term viability of major facilities (rather than sensitive land uses) (Provincial Policy 
Statement, 2014). The responsibility of establishing the size of these buffers is then left to the 
local government and conservation authority. This is demonstrated in Ontario Regulation 155/06 
under the Conservation Authorities Act and the Official Plan Amendment 128 (OPA 128) by the 
City of Niagara Falls. Ontario Regulation 155/06, referring specifically to the Niagara Peninsula 
Conservation Authority (NPCA), addresses this issue to an extent by discussing maximum 
(rather than minimum) distances between wetlands and development. Under this regulation, 
development is not permitted in a wetland or areas where development could interfere with the 
hydrological function of a wetland (O. Reg. 155/06). This includes up to 120 metres from all 
PSWs and wetlands greater than 2 hectares in size. Wetlands less than 2 hectares are given a 
buffer of up to 30 metres (O. Reg. 155/06). The Regulation makes no distinction between 
wetlands and PSWs. Due to the lack of guidance from provincial policies, the City of Niagara 
Falls approved an OPA 128 that establishes a 30-metre buffer to protect the ecological and 
hydrological functions of the natural heritage features (City of Niagara Falls, 2018). However, 
this buffer may be altered with the approval of an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) through the 
subdivision and development application process.  
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If development is to occur within a wetland on the property specific to the OPA 128, it 
must be based on the findings and conditions of an EIS and a work permit shall be obtained from 
the conservation authority before the approval of development plans (City of Niagara Falls, 
2018). If the terms of the work permit are violated, the conservation authority has several legal 
tools at its disposal. It can issue a stop order that requires the person to stop engaging in an 
activity that violates the work permit, a fine can be issued, or a rehabilitation order can be issued 
to a person to remove any development ordered by the court or to take actions to repair or 
rehabilitate the damage that had resulted from the offence (Conservation Authorities Act, 1990). 
The PSW on the study area is, therefore, subject to the combined regulatory efforts of the PPS, 
Conservation Authorities Act, and Niagara Falls’ OPA 128.  
7.2 Historical Analysis 
7.2.1 About the Property 
7.2.1.1 Basics of the Land 
On November 5, 2015, the project applicant purchased 484 acres of land in the City of 
Niagara Falls, Ontario, locally known as Thundering Waters, for $22.5 million (Ontario Land 
Registry Office, 2016, April 18; Savanta Inc, 2017). The property is located north of the Welland 
River/Chippawa Parkway, east of the Ontario Power Generation Inc./Chippawa Power Canal, 
south of Oldfield Road and west of Stanley Avenue (Savanta Inc, 2017). It is located near the 
heart of the City, within walking distance of several tourist attractions such as the Niagara Falls, 
Marineland Park, and the Casino District.  
7.2.1.2 What does the project want to do? 
On November 13, 2015 a non-legally binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
was signed between the project applicant and the City of Niagara Falls outlining an agreement 
for the intended use of the property, later referred to as Riverfront Community (Memorandum of 
Understanding, 2015, November 13). The agreement outlines the desires of both parties to 
support and attract investment to the project (Memorandum of Understanding, 2015, November 
13).  
The Riverfront Community development project proposes to develop 121 acres (Savanta 
Inc, 2017) of the property for a mix of residential, commercial, and institutional uses (Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs, 2016, December 13). The plan sets out four stages that are projected to span 
eight years that would include train services linking to Niagara Falls tourist sites and casino 
resorts, commercial and recreational spaces, and residential areas (Spiteri, 2018 February 1). The 
goal of the project is to encourage a healthy, active lifestyle by providing access to outdoor 
amenities on the property such as golf training and sports facilities (GR Investment Group, 
2019).  
The project is estimated as a $1.5 billion deal for the City of Niagara Falls (Diodati, 
2016, December 2) that plans to include more than 1,000 dwelling units, 500 hotel units, creating 
1,800-2,800 jobs and benefitting over 2,600 people (Spiteri, 2018 February 1). The project is 
expected to create desirable economic development and employment opportunities, adding to the 
City’s destination vacation and tourism infrastructure (Diodati, 2016, December 2). The Mayor 
of Niagara Falls has argued that the development project would demonstrate progressive land use 
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planning policies, including the protection of the Natural Heritage System, integrated live-work 
communities, affordable housing opportunities, and support for local and regional transit 
initiatives (Diodati, 2016, December 2).  
7.2.1.3 Project Challenges 
Despite the potential economic gains to the City of Niagara Falls the plan has faced 
substantial obstacles. According to the Niagara Region’s Official Plan, the property had been 
included in the Urban Area Boundary for development since the 1970s (Diodati, 2016, 
December 2). Therefore, in an effort to prevent urban sprawl and meet the needs of the 
Provincial Growth Plan that emphasizes the utilization of existing urban lands, the property was 
re-designated from industrial to residential use in 2008 with the approval of the Official Plan 
Amendment #81 (OPA 81) (Diodati, 2016, December 2).  
However, according to environmental impact studies, the property contains several 
natural heritage features protected under the PPS, including 282 acres of PSWs at the time of 
purchase (Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2016, December 13), which prevents development from 
occurring on or near designated wetlands (Provincial Policy Statement, 2014). This area was 
further increased to 334 acres in 2016 after a field assessment from the MNRF, designating 
approximately 70 per cent of the property as provincially protected (Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs, 2016, December 13). The property is also home to several endangered and threatened 
species, in addition to provincially and regionally rare species (Dougan & Associates, 2016; 
Savanta Inc, 2017). As a result of additional PSWs, the project was then stalled because original 
plans had identified newly designated PSWs as areas for development and therefore violated 
provincial policy (Dougan & Associates, 2016).  
7.2.2 Environmental Impact Studies  
7.2.2.1 Characteristics of Wetlands on the Property  
EIS were completed on the property in June of 2016 and September of 2017 by two 
independent consulting firms. The studies assessed several aspects of the property including 
plant and wildlife species, significant wetlands, significant valleyland, significant wildlife 
habitat, habitat of endangered and threatened species, impacts of development on these areas and 
several other aspects of the property (Savanta Inc, 2017).  
According to the 2010 OWES evaluation, the property was presented with a total score of 
624 out of a possible 1,000 points, exceeding the threshold for a PSW (Savanta Inc, 2017). The 
total area of wetland within the complex was identified as 281.3 acres with a total catchment area 
of 2,079.56 acres (Savanta Inc, 2017). This includes several small units of wetlands, some 
varying in size from 0.00 ha (too small to measure) to 54.64 ha (Savanta Inc, 2017). However, 
the MNRF notes that this is a standard procedure of the OWES and considers the entire area as a 
single wetland despite profound ecological differences across the landscape (McKenna, 2016, 
December 11). Therefore, during EIS evaluations, the property should be evaluated as a single 
unit including all wetland types (McKenna, 2016, December 11) rather than just the evaluation 
of the slough forest that makes up a majority of wetland area on the property (99.6 ha), which 
has remained relatively pristine woodlands and wetlands (Savanta Inc, 2017).  
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The slough forest features, also referred to as vernal pools, have small catchments around 
individually isolated pool features that collect water from precipitation and overland runoff from 
nearby catchments (Savanta Inc, 2017). Vernal pools are well known for their potential to 
support local amphibians (e.g. salamanders) for breeding and offspring development (Savanta 
Inc, 2017). The EIS definitively confirmed the significance and sensitivity of these slough 
features, covering the majority of the property but were confirmed to be outside the area 
proposed for development (Savanta Inc, 2017). 
Other areas on the property had been actively farmed after the 1960s but have returned to 
natural vegetation cover (refer to Appendix C) (Savanta Inc, 2017). The EIS also refers to an 
area on the southern side of the property of relatively young wetland features that show signs of 
significant disturbances that have been affected by large-scale activities such as the re-alignment 
of the Welland River, the creation of the Chippawa Power Canal and Conrail Drain and railway 
line, and associated deforestation and filling of the land (Savanta Inc, 2017). Since then, 
vegetation has continued to grow but has experienced ongoing active and passive recreation 
disturbances (e.g. recreational vehicles and hunting) in some areas associated with uncontrolled 
access to the property (Savanta Inc, 2017). This has resulted in relatively limited ecological 
features and functions, leading the EIS assessor to question their merit as PSWs (Savanta Inc, 
2017). Based on discussions with individuals involved, this assessment of varying degrees of 
quality of individual wetland features has supported discussions of development on part of the 
property that consist of PSWs with limited ecological functions but has received substantial 
backlash from environmentalists.  
7.2.2.2 Mitigation Measures 
 While direct construction impacts are avoided on slough forest wetland features, the EIS 
notes the importance of maintaining hydrological conditions (quantity and quality) sensitive to 
changes in the landscape that are associated with construction activities such as the deposition of 
sediment and changes to oxygen levels (Savanta Inc, 2017). The EIS recommends several 
mitigation measures to avoid and limit direct and indirect impacts to wetland features. This 
includes further assessments of hydrological conditions, maintenance of migratory linkages 
between wetland units and the establishment of buffer zones ranging from 10-30m (Savanta Inc, 
2017).  
 However, the EIS notes the removal of almost 11 acres of PSWs to support the proposed 
development, suggesting these units do not warrant a PSW classification (Savanta Inc, 2017). 
Yet, the MNRF has dismissed this assessment and reinforces the PPS which states that there 
shall be no development or site alteration within PSWs in southern Ontario (Thornton, 2016, 
August 19; McKenna, 2016, December 11). The MNRF concluded with feedback on both studies 
and supplementary materials claiming that they do not adequately inform the OPA 128 for 
further development (McKenna, 2018, January 15) that sets the policy framework for the 
proposed project on the property (Niagara Falls City Council, 2018 May 8).  
7.2.3 Attempts at Resolution  
 Based on an interview with a Niagara Falls city councillor, there had been no attempt at 
conflict resolution to date to address concerns among competing interests. However, the Mayor 
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of Niagara Falls and the NPCA had made previous attempts to address concerns by seeking 
assistance from the Provincial government.  
 In an effort to resolve the planning issues created by the newly designated PSWs and 
continue with development, the Mayor of Niagara Falls requested assistance from the provincial 
government in the form of a Provincial Development Facilitator that would work with local, 
regional, and provincial staff to facilitate the development of the project (Diodati, 2017, January 
9). The Mayor reiterated in his correspondence with the Province that the investment opportunity 
with the project applicant is a result of a joint effort by the City and the Province to attract 
Chinese investment to Ontario and this project specifically would leverage significant investment 
in a growing trade partner and stimulate economic growth locally (Diodati, 2017, January 9; 
Diodati, 2017, January 12). The Mayor continues by expressing the additional designations of 
PSWs in 2016 severely limit the potential for development and threaten to put an end to the 
project entirely (Diodati, 2017, January 12). However, this request was subsequently denied by 
the Province (Mauro, 2017, January 25). When these correspondences came to light as a result of 
FOI requests by concerned citizens, several opponents of the project claimed the Mayor had been 
lobbying the provincial government on behalf of the developer, thereby exemplifying a conflict 
of interest.  
 After interviewing several interested parties, it appears that public attention and scrutiny 
of the Riverfront Community project began after public presentations were made by the Region 
of Niagara proposing biodiversity offsetting of several units of wetlands at a 3:1 ratio, thereby 
promoting a net gain of wetlands as a result of the project (Lysyk, 2018). The initiative was put 
forth as a pilot project by the NPCA but was not supported by the Province (Lysyk, 2018). 
Nearly all interview participants, as well as NPCA staff members (Lysyk, 2018), expressed 
unease at the lack of scientific evidence articulating an ability to recreate the ecological 
conditions of the slough forest. After intense opposition from the local community and the lack 
of support from the Province, biodiversity offsetting was subsequently abandoned.  
 The MNRF has weighed in on several occasions, urging the City, Region and developer 
to abide by the direction set out by the Planning Act and the PPS stating that there shall be no 
development or site alteration within PSWs in southern Ontario (Thornton, 2016, August 19; 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2016, December 13). The MMA has also encouraged that all 
decisions affecting planning matters shall be made in accordance with the PPS, including 
decisions made under the Growth Plan that support planning and economic development, 
promotion of increased opportunities for cross-border trade, and movement of goods and 
services (Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2016, December 13).  
7.2.4 Opposition to Development 
 According to personal communication with the event organizer, in the summer of 2017 a 
group of citizen activists demonstrated in an act of civil protest by camping on the property for 
several days. The purpose of the protest was to attract attention to the property and the threats to 
the ecosystem (Bennett, 2017). They did this by encouraging individuals to visit the property and 
learn about the different species and the ecosystem services provided by wetlands. It was also 
used to demonstrate to local politicians that the public was concerned for the species and 
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wetlands on the property and should therefore be protected in future city council meetings 
(Bennett, 2017).  
Protestors expressed concern that despite provincially protected wetlands, the 
development on any part of the land has the potential to isolate species that depend on open 
spaces such as the meadows and thickets in between the wetlands that are subject to development 
(Niagara Falls Review, 2017). According to a city councillor who visited the property during the 
protest, she expressed feeling thrilled to learn about and have the opportunity to see the different 
species within her neighborhood.  
Throughout the planning stages of the project the City of Niagara Falls held several city 
council meetings where citizens were given the opportunity to voice their support or opposition 
for the Riverfront Community. The most noteworthy was the council meeting held on May 8, 
2018 discussing the approval of the OPA 128 that sets the policy framework for the proposed 
project on the property. Despite public opposition against biodiversity offsetting, OPA 128 refers 
to “habitat relocation” of significant species if permits or approvals are obtained by MNRF 
(Niagara Falls City Council, 2018, May 8). The amendment also plans that if a PSW designation 
is removed and does not warrant any other protective status (e.g. Significant woodland, 
significant wildlife habitat), the feature will assume the status of adjacent lands (Niagara Falls 
City Council, 2018, May 8).  
When the floor was opened to the public, five citizens spoke in favour of the 
development project citing the promotion of businesses in the area (Niagara Falls City Council, 
2018, May 8). However, twenty-five others spoke against the proposed project, citing concerns 
for the PSWs, wildlife, drinking water, and the premature nature of the proposal (Niagara Falls 
City Council, 2018, May 8). Despite this majority, city council voted 6-2 (one absent councillor) 
in favour of OPA 128 (Niagara Falls City Council, 2018, May 8).  
Approval of OPA 128 allows the project applicant to move to the next stages towards the 
development of the project which are plans for subdivision and zoning by-law amendments. 
With approval, the amendment seeks to allow the Riverfront Community plan to proceed in 
advance of the secondary plan (City of Niagara Falls, 2018, May 8). Included in the approval 
were twenty-seven recommendations by Council that involved the clarification of the location of 
PSWs in relation to development, size of buffers, and several other considerations iterated in the 
EIS to ensure that the project abides by provincial policy (City of Niagara Falls, 2018, May 8).   
 Shortly after the approval of the OPA 128, in August of 2018, a local environmentalist 
filed an appeal with the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) citing inconsistencies between 
the OPA 128 and provincial policy concerning PSWs and wildlife habitat (Spiteri, 2019 
November 4). The LPAT is an independent administrative tribunal that is responsible for hearing 
appeals on a variety of municipal matters and whose members are appointed by the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2020). In November of the 
following year the appeal was dismissed, concluding that the appellant cited unqualified opinions 
and statements in his submission that were not supported by the record or any qualified planner 
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or ecologist sought by the Tribunal (Spiteri, 2019 November 4). Despite this decision, the 
appellant is currently seeking a review of the LPAT dismissal (Spiteri, 2019 November 8).  
A vocal group against the proposed Riverfront Community is the Haudenosaunee, 
consisting of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora Nations, who 
held a rally in 2016 in opposition of the development proposal (Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 
2016, December 13). The Haudenosaunee feel they represent the communities with the land and 
all that inhabit it and have taken on responsibility to heal and protect the land generally to ensure 
better conditions for future generations (Lickers, 2017, March 8).  
 The Haudenosaunee claim that the Riverfront Community will interfere with, impair and 
infringe upon Haudenosaunee title, rights and interests as guaranteed and recognized by the 
Nanfan Treaty of 1701, Mitchell map of 1755, August Treaty of 1764 and the Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix of 1768 (Detlor, 2016). It is also claimed that the decision in Seneca Nation of Indians v. 
New York (2004) confirms that Thundering Waters was to have been held in trust for the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy (Detlor, 2016).  
 The Haudenosaunee confirmed that the Crown’s fiduciary duty to receive consent before 
the infringement of treaty rights had not occurred and requested the planning process be placed 
on hold until such time as Ontario has fulfilled these obligations (Detlor, 2016). To refuse or fail 
to fulfill this obligation would be considered an act of bad faith (Detlor, 2016). The 
Haudenosaunee express disapproval for the development project because of the perceived 
detrimental effects to the remaining natural space on the property and specific concern for the 
resident wildlife that rely on the land (Lickers, 2017, March 8).  
MMA has urged the Region of Niagara to consult with Indigenous and First Nations 
Communities regarding the Region’s Secondary Plan (OPA No. 117) (Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs, 2016, December 13). The PPS encourages municipalities to coordinate planning matters 
with indigenous communities and to implement the policy in a manner that recognizes and 
affirms treaty rights in Section 35 of the Constitution Act (City of Niagara Falls, 2018, May 8). 
According to the City of Niagara Falls’ Planning Department, the Mississaugas of the New 
Credit, the Six Nations Elected Council, the Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI), and 
the Metis Nation of Ontario were given notices of public meetings and public forums (City of 
Niagara Falls, 2018, May 8). It was also noted that City staff had met with Six Nations Council 
and the HDI during the secondary planning process and the HDI had expressed that the duty to 
consult rests with the Crown and cannot be undertaken by municipal governments which are not 
considered Crown entities (City of Niagara Falls, 2018, May 8). According to the HDI, 
municipalities may negotiate details of a proposal with Indigenous communities, but this does 
not constitute fulfilling the duty to consult (City of Niagara Falls, 2018, May 8). Therefore, the 
Indigenous community has continued to express opposition of the Riverfront Community citing 
concerns for the biodiversity, the land to which they feel responsible for protecting, in addition to 
title and treaty rights.  
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7.2.5 Niagara Peninsula Conservation Authority  
 According to the Auditor General’s 2018 audit of the NPCA, the Niagara Region’s 
representatives were almost entirely (11 out of 12) comprised of elected officials in 2015. In 
2017, the NPCA received roughly $8.9 million, or 71 per cent of its total annual revenue, from 
municipalities (Lysyk, 2018). Therefore, a clear influence from the Region’s municipal 
governments had led to mounting concerns and criticisms against the conservation authority.  
 The audit concluded with several operational issues specific to the property and the 
NPCA that could be rooted back to the broader governance of conservation authorities, including 
the authority to vote and generally act on behalf of their municipality, as mandated by the 
Conservation Authorities Act (Lysyk, 2018). However, employees of the NPCA and the public 
felt it should act in the best interest of the conservation authority it represents (Lysyk, 2018). 
 The audit report found several instances in 2015 of NPCA senior management taking 
steps that would threaten to destroy the wetland complex on the property. This was reflected in 
meeting minutes of NPCA staff with representatives from the City of Niagara Falls, Niagara 
region and the developer (Lysyk, 2018). It was in these notes that NPCA senior management 
informs the developer that it was working on alternative ways to address the obstacle posed by 
the wetlands (Lysyk, 2018). It was also discovered that the NPCA had retained the services of a 
lobbying firm to organize meetings with the provincial government to discuss the approval of a 
pilot project that would utilize biodiversity offsetting of the wetlands on the property with a 3:1 
ratio to compensate (Lysyk, 2018). NPCA staff expressed concern for the lack of scientific 
evidence to support the proposed pilot project because no studies of the property’s ecosystems 
had been conducted to determine whether they contained unique features that cannot be 
replicated (Lysyk, 2018).  
 It was noted that in 2008, before the wetlands were designated as provincially significant 
under the Planning Act thereby prohibiting development, a municipal staff member requested 
that the NPCA allow biodiversity offsetting on the property (Lysyk, 2018). However, NPCA 
staff expressed concerns to the NPCA Board that, although development was not prohibited, a 
large-scale relocation of wetlands to accommodate a development project was outside the 
parameters of NPCA policies.  
 The NPCA Code of Conduct requires its members to avoid conflict of interest with 
regards to their fiduciary duties (their duty to care for the NPCA’s resources) but fails to address 
how its members’ competing interests, as elected municipal officials, may also be considered a 
conflict of interest (Lysyk, 2018). The Board had no procedural guidance on how to identify 
such circumstances or relationships that could lead to this conflict of interest, therefore the onus 
is on the individual members to recognize and declare, in their opinion, whether there is a 
conflict.  
 In addition to conflicts of interest, the NPCA has received criticisms for failing to address 
environmental wrongdoings. There were several cases of the NPCA failing to act when the 
Conservation Authorities Act was violated (e.g. when wetlands are destroyed or damaged, or 
debris is dumped into a waterway) (Lysyk, 2018). It was noted that between 2013-2017, one 
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quarter of complaints of Conservation Authority Act violations were still open, therefore the 
potential violation had not been addressed and environmental damages had not been resolved.  
 As a result of what some citizens described as a ‘dual agenda’ among Board members 
who held elected municipal positions, a level of distrust and discontent began to emerge. Some 
citizens felt that elected officials had infiltrated the conservation authority in order to push 
development projects through. The most prominent example was of the mayor of Niagara Falls 
who held a position at City Council, Regional Council and the NPCA. While holding these 
positions, he had flown to China and returned with a signed MOU discussing the partnership and 
intention to ‘promote investment and development’ opportunities without consultation from the 
Niagara Falls City Council (Memorandum of Understanding, 2015, November 13).  
7.2.6 Present Day 
 Five years after the property was purchased no development has been permitted. Despite 
this, violation notices by the NPCA have been filed against the project applicant in 2018 and 
2020 for violating the Conservation Authorities Act and causing damages to PSWs as a result of 
unauthorized work on the property within range of a PSW (Howard, 2018, December 3; Hill, 
2020, January 24), thereby adding to the mistrust and damaged relationship between the 
developer and concerned environmentalists.  
 Despite a large-scale development project with the potential to bring sizeable economic 
opportunities to the City of Niagara Falls, the project is faced is substantial opposition to 
preserve remaining wetlands in the region that are threatened by such projects. The case of 
Riverfront Community demonstrates the classic example of the competing interests of various 
societal groups pertaining to land use management in Ontario and the strategies needed to 
balance these concerns.  
The lack of transparency within the decision-making process and perceived conflicts of 
interest in local governance structures has resulted in tension between citizens and decision-
makers that has impacted the ability to address these competing interests. To better understand 
how different perspectives and conflicts inform land use decision, a social multi-criteria 
evaluation was used that incorporated the knowledge of local stakeholders to generate policy 
options and criteria to manage and evaluate these competing interests. The purpose of this 
evaluation was to identify acceptable compromises to involved stakeholders and serve as a 




Chapter 8: SMCE Results 
8.1 Options and Criteria 
A majority of participants focused their discussion of criteria on the protection of 
ecological and biological aspects of the property that indirectly benefit their well-being with the 
knowledge that the natural environment was being managed sustainably despite any direct 
interaction with these features. The criteria are meant to represent major trade-offs in the 
empirical application of the decision-making model. As a result, a large number of criteria was 
identified, as shown in Table 2 and condensed into a short list that reflected three main 
classifications: environmental, socio-cultural, and economic criteria as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 2 Criteria Derived from Participant Interviews 
Class Criteria Description
Protect biodiversity
Ensure population of species are maintained with corridors to 
allow migration and the invasive species are reduced/eradicated
Maintain forest cover
Maintenance of area covered by forest to ensure the promotion of 
clean air 
Safe interaction with 
nature
Light trails guiding human interaction with natural areas and 
limiting impact to wildlife
Sustainability
Ensures the long-term sustainability of wetlands and other natural 
heritage features
Refuge from City Amount of available green space away from city streets
Maintain unique 
Canadian landscape Amount of slough forest maintained (% of overall land)
Cultural Identity Maintenance of local traditions and knowledge
Education Available formal and informal education of wetland services
Local employment Generation of steady, permanent jobs for locals
Economic growth Economy of Niagara Falls/Region is stimulated and growing
Affordable housing Attend to housing demand and address increasing housing demand
Markets
Promote the development of various industries that foster the local 
economy
Maintain natural 
aesthetics Ensure green space to enjoy
Public accessibility Public access to natural areas. Absence of fences or barriers 
Intergenerational 








Table 3 Categorized Evaluation Criteria 
 Management options were also discussed in interviews with individual participants to 
generate alternative management approaches with regards to the property and its natural 
resources. The landowners’ land use plan as described in the City of Niagara Falls’ OPA 128, 
referred to here as ‘Development as Planned’, was used as the baseline option for which 
alternatives were to be generated around (see Appendix D for a map describing this scenario). 
However, due to the encroachment of development into PSWs included in this plan and therefore 
a violation of the PPS (2014), the option is put forth under the assumption that the PSW 
designation of impacted wetlands on the south-western portion of the property are removed 
under the authority of the MNRF.  
 Many participants expressed their desires to see the property turned into a publicly 
accessible conservation area to preserve the ecological functions of the Carolinian forest of 
which the property is a part, with no development occurring on any part of the property. As a 
result, many participants referred to this option as their ideal, best case scenario throughout 
discussions and was therefore included as a Conservation option in the evaluation.  
 Since the issue of biodiversity offsetting was already put forth previously by the NPCA 
and subsequently dismissed, it was not considered as a management option in the evaluation. 
One participant expressed his support for offsetting but admitted that it was not an approach that 
would be accepted by the general public as a result of the poor relationship the NPCA held with 
the public. The main concerns driving the dismissal of biodiversity offsetting centered on the 
lack of trust to adequately recreate the ecological functions of the wetlands, particularly the 
slough forest on the northern portion of the property. When participants were prompted to 
consider the offsetting of the relatively new and manmade wetlands on the southern portion of 
the property, many participants pointed to the OWES and its rationale for their recent 




Ensure the population of species are maintained with corridors to 
allow migration on the property, invasive species are 
reduced/eradicated, forest cover is maintained to ensure the long-
term sustainability of natural areas to benefit future generations.
Safe interaction 
with nature
Light trails are created to guide human interaction through natural 
areas while limiting impact to wildlife and ecological functions of 
wetlands.
Cultural identity
Maintenance of local traditions and knowledge and spiritual 
connection with the land. 
Education





The economy of Niagara Falls and the Region is stimulated and 
growing, promoting the development of various industries and 





respected without interference. Additionally, in a FOI request correspondence, the MNRF 
explicitly expresses its disapproval of the offsetting of PSWs (Thornton, 2016, August 19; 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2016, December 13).  
 The potential of implementing a PES program was also rejected by most participants. 
Some expressed interest but lacked faith that it would be supported by residents of the 
community. It was argued that because the projected revenue for the proposed project is so high 
it would not be feasible for the community to raise the money to compensate the landowner to 
forgo the project and manage the rehabilitation of the property in its entirety.  
 As an alternative option, many participants expressed varying degrees of support for a 
scaled back version of the project that does not encroach on any PSW, including the smaller 
wetlands on the south-western portion of the property, while maintaining a respectable buffer. 
This option is demonstrated in a visual shown in Appendix E and referred to as ‘Alternate 
Development’. As a condition for allowing development to occur, ownership of the area covered 
by PSWs, including a 30-metre buffer as recommended in the 2017 EIS, is transferred to a public 
authority. The landowner then retains ownership of the remaining land to develop where feasibly 
possible without isolating PSWs from the rest of the complex or blocking migratory paths of 
terrestrial species.  
 As a result, three management options (Table 4) were generated for the evaluation. 
Although these were the names given to the options, many participants clarified and highlighted 
their preferences by evaluating the scenarios based on their interpretation of each option. For 
example, one participant differentiated between Alternate Development and Development as 
Planned as publicly owned wetlands and privately-owned wetlands. In a second interview, 
participants were then asked their opinions on these options as they relate to the criteria and were 
asked to assign weights accordingly.  
 
Table 4 Evaluation Options 
8.2 The Impact Matrix  
From the nine individuals who participated in an initial interview, seven were available for a 
second interview to weigh and score the options and criteria. The results of the individual 
Option Type Scenario Description
Public or privately owned conservation park with publicly accessible trails. No 
development occurs. 
Formal, binding agreement with financial penalties/incentives holding the landowner 
responsible for the protection of wetlands.
Alternate 
Development
Scale back project - ALL significant wetlands are avoided with a 30-metre buffer. 
Ownership of the area covered by PSWs and buffers is transferred to a public 
authority as a condition for development to occur.  Remaining area remains privately 
owned for development. 
Development as 
Planned
Development as planned (according to the OPA Schedule A-6) with the removal of 





assessments are discussed below, noting favourable options and criteria while highlighting 
notable findings where appropriate. Screenshots from OPTamos are also used to conceptualize 
the results of each analysis. A further discussion about the combined results will be explored in 
the following chapter.  
8.2.1 Participant A1 
The results of the evaluation for the participant coded A1 is demonstrated in Table 5 and 
Figure 2. Participant A1 favoured the protection of the natural environment from human activity 
to ensure long term sustainability. Therefore, Environmental Sustainability (36.5%) and Safe 
Interaction with Nature (31.5%) were identified as the most important criteria when evaluating 
the options. While Economic Growth was identified as the least important criteria (1.87%).  
 
Table 5 A1 Impact Matrix 
 
Figure 2 A1 Impact Matrix 
 As a result, Alternate Development (54.93%) was the preferred choice by a significant 
margin because the participant felt that a public authority was necessary to address the threat of 
invasive species on the property and protect from further degradation to the ecological functions 
of the wetlands on the property. Conservation (39.89%) followed as the next best option, with 
Development as Planned (5.18%) indicated as barely acceptable. The only criteria Development 
as Planned was thought to address adequately, compared to the other options, was Economic 
Criteria Conservation Alternate Development Development as Planned Inconsistency ratio % of importance
Environmental Sustainability 37.21 58.37 4.42 0.22 36.49
Safe Interaction with Nature 38.02 57.89 4.09 0.32 31.54
Cultural Identity 52.76 42.71 4.52 0.12 17.35
Education 39.44 56.34 4.23 0.25 12.76




Growth (51.04 points). However, due to the low level of importance assigned to this criterion, 
this made little difference to the acceptability of Development as Planned as a viable option to 
pursue. The only criteria Alternate Development did not outperform the other two options were 
Cultural Identity, which was thought to be best address through Conservation, and Economic 
Growth, which was thought to be best addressed through Development as Planned. However 
Alternate Development was ranked the second-best option to address both these criteria.  
Despite a sensitivity analysis, by which the weights of the criteria were changed, Alternate 
Development remained the clear choice for Participant A1 when considering all five criteria. 
Conservation consistently ranks in the second position while Development as Planned is ranked 
as the last option. 
8.2.2 Participant S2 
Participant S2’s results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 3. Participant S2 also favoured 
Environmental Sustainability (37.37%) over all other criteria. It is worth noting that Participant 
S2 argued that Safe Interaction with Nature (26.42%) and Education (24.52%) were closely 
related, which is why they were given similar levels of importance. It was thought that through 
educating the public on the importance of wetlands it would also teach them how to safely 
interact with the natural environment, including wetlands. The lowest ranked criteria were 
Cultural Identity (5.61%) and Economic Growth (6.08%).  
 
Table 6 S2 Impact Matrix 
Criteria Conservation Alternate Development Development as Planned Inconsistency ratio % of importance
Environmental Sustainability 63.85 32.28 3.87 0.44 37.37
Safe Interaction with Nature 55.72 38.31 5.97 0.19 26.42
Cultural Identity 80.09 13.11 6.79 0.05 5.61
Education 70.48 25.06 4.46 0.28 24.52





Figure 3 S2 Impact Matrix 
 The results clearly indicate a strong preference for Conservation (63.58%) as it 
outperformed the other options in every criterion, including Economic Growth. During the 
evaluation, the participant reasoned that the non-market values of the ecosystem services were of 
more value to the Niagara Region’s economy than any scale of development. The strong 
preference for Conservation did not change with the sensitivity analysis and therefore 
demonstrates Participant S2’s clear preference towards Conservation.  
Development as Planned (5.48%) was not viewed as a favourable option when 
considering any of the criteria. When it came time to evaluate Alternate Development and 
Development as Planned against each other, Participant S2 often mentioned that the lesser of two 
evils (Alternate Development) was being chosen. Therefore, although Alternate Development 
was indicated as the second preferred option, it was not seen as a favourable option because of 
the consequences increased human interference has on its immediate surroundings as a result of 
development, such as noise, construction, spread of invasive species, and run-off of 
contaminants.  
Overall, there is a clear ranking of the options. Conservation is argued to ensure all 
criterion to the greatest extent. This is followed by Alternate Development which did not 
outperform any of the options in any of the criteria but was rather regarded as the lesser of two 
evils. Lastly, Development as Planned was regarded as the worst-case scenario by this 
participant.  
8.2.3 Participant P1 
 Participant P1’s results are shown in Table 7 and Figure 4. P1’s perspective was very 
different from Participants A1 and S2. Rather than Environmental Sustainability, as indicated by 
Participants A1 and S2, this participant favoured Economic Growth (42.57%) above all other 
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criteria. While Cultural Identity (6.84%) was identified as the least important criteria, just below 
Environmental Sustainability (10.85%). However, Safe Interaction with Nature (20.87%) and 
Education (18.86%) were regarded as relatively important. 
 
Table 7 P1 Impact Matrix 
 
Figure 4 P1 Impact Matrix 
 Participant P1 clearly preferred Alternate Development (63.14%) to Conservation 
(20.14%) and Development as Planned (16.72%). Throughout the evaluation, the participant 
indicated the potential for Alternate Development to outperform the other two options in each of 
the criteria, allocating a mean average of 63.91 points towards Alternate Development. It was 
thought that Conservation would address each of the criteria relatively well except for Economic 
Growth, but no criteria were to the same potential as Alternate Development because of the 
ability for intervention and to provide safe accessibility to the public. The participant explained 
that intervention through Alternate Development was necessary to raise more awareness of the 
value of wetlands (Education) and why they are important to others (Cultural Identity). In the 
participant’s view, this would not occur if the property was turned into a conservation area and 
left in its current state.  
Although Development as Planned was regarded relatively poor among each of the 
criteria by this participant, it was thought to bring relative Economic Growth (28.99 points), 
although not to the extent of Alternate Development (64.93 points). Due to the relatively high 
Criteria Conservation Alternate Development Development as Planned Inconsistency ratio % of importance
Environmental Sustainability 26.01 69.36 4.62 0.24 10.85
Safe Interaction with Nature 36.93 51.84 11.23 1.65 20.87
Cultural Identity 27.32 66.71 5.97 0.25 6.84
Education 27.32 66.71 5.97 0.25 18.86




importance the participant gave to Economic Growth, this increased the overall acceptability of 
Development as Planned as an option. Even after a sensitivity analysis, the preferred order of 
options remained the same with Alternate Development as the clear choice by Participant P1. 
Overall, this participant clearly associated Alternate Development as the most preferred option 
with Conservation only slightly more desirable than Development as Planned due to the 
environmental and socio-cultural criteria.  
8.2.4 Participant A2  
 The results from Participant A2 are shown in Table 8 and Figure 5. This participant 
demonstrated a strong preference for any option that promoted Environmental Sustainability, as 
this was indicated as the most important criteria (47.5%). Education (24.44%) and Safe 
Interaction with Nature (17.64%) were thought to be closely tied and relatively important, while 
Cultural Identity (8.61%) was regarded as slightly more important than Economic Growth 
(1.81%).  
 
Table 8 A2 Impact Matrix 
 
Figure 5 A2 Impact Matrix 
Throughout the evaluation, the participant expressed that any option that was not 
Conservation would be unacceptable. Therefore, Conservation (58.74%) resulted as the preferred 
choice, followed by Alternate Development (32.35%) and Development as Planned (8.92%). 
Whenever the participant was to evaluate a scenario that included Development as Planned, it 
Criteria Conservation Alternate Development Development as Planned Inconsistency ratio % of importance
Environmental Sustainability 64.99 31.26 3.75 0.48 47.50
Safe Interaction with Nature 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00 17.64
Cultural Identity 63.06 33.33 3.60 0.53 8.61
Education 63.06 33.33 3.60 0.53 24.44




was indicated that the preference should be completely given to the alternative option regardless 
of whether the option was Conservation or Alternate Development. Therefore, just as Participant 
S2 indicated, Participant A2 made decisions based on the lesser of two evils, rather than 
consideration of what the expected outcome would be of each criterion.  
Although Safe Interaction with Nature (17.64%) was given relative importance, the 
participant indicated that all options would have the same effect because none of the options 
should, from the participant’s perspective, allow public access to the property. Rather, people 
should be able to enjoy the nature from the road without stepping onto the property. The last 
three criteria (Cultural Identity, Education, and Economic Growth) were all heavily skewed 
towards Conservation (63.06 points). The participant did not give much reasoning for this, but 
again expressed discomfort for any development that occurred on the property that, from the 
participants’ perspective, would damage the ecological functions and ability to support 
biodiversity on the property. Therefore, regardless of the weights changed through a sensitivity 
analysis, the order of preferred options remained constant with Conservation as the preferred 
option.  
8.2.5 Participant I1 
The results from Participant I1 are shown in Table 9 and Figure 6. This participant 
identified Environmental Sustainability as the most important criteria (39.28%). While Safe 
Interaction with Nature (21.61%) and Cultural Identity (21.14%) closely followed. Economic 
Growth (1.83%) was identified as the least important criteria, which aligns with what several 
other participants have demonstrated in previously discussed evaluations.  
 
Table 9 I1 Impact Matrix 
Criteria Conservation Alternate Development Development as Planned Inconsistency ratio % of importance
Environmental Sustainability 63.06 33.33 3.60 0.53 39.28
Safe Interaction with Nature 54.64 40.98 4.37 0.19 21.61
Cultural Identity 57.89 38.02 4.09 0.32 21.14
Education 54.64 40.98 4.37 0.19 16.14






Figure 6 I1 Impact Matrix 
 Overall, Conservation (58.25%) was strongly preferred to Alternate Development 
(37.69%). With Development as Planned (4.07%) scoring very low against all criteria. 
Conservation was identified as the most favourable option for every criterion except for 
Economic Growth (33.33 points), for which Alternate Development (59.14 points) was identified 
as the option to address this criterion most effectively.  
 The order of preferred options did not change with a sensitivity analysis, thereby 
confirming the participant’s clear preference towards Conservation, followed by Alternate 
Development, and Development as Planned last.  
8.2.6 Participant S1 
The results of Participant S1 are shown in Table 10 and Figure 7. After reviewing the 
results of the evaluation, it appears that Economic Growth (39.46%) is the most important 
criteria for this participant, followed by Environmental Sustainability (30.85%). Cultural Identity 
(4.6%) and Education (4.54%) were closely regarded as the least important criteria, to this 
participant, and were often seen as the same, if not complementary of one another.  
 
Table 10 S1 Impact Matrix 
Criteria Conservation Alternate Development Development as Planned Inconsistency ratio % of importance
Environmental Sustainability 14.37 78.16 7.47 0.05 30.85
Safe Interaction with Nature 53.50 34.39 12.10 0.02 20.54
Cultural Identity 63.58 18.54 17.88 0.01 4.60
Education 59.91 32.68 7.41 0.06 4.54





Figure 7 S1 Impact Matrix 
 Although Development as Planned was indicated to address Economic Growth the best 
out of the three options (57.89 points), Alternate Development (48.52%) was regarded as the 
most preferred option overall  with Development as Planned (28.79%) slightly more favourable 
than Conservation (22.68%). Participant S1 indicated Alternate Development as the option that 
would best ensure Environmental Sustainability by a wide margin (63.79 points greater than the 
second preferred option, Conservation) largely attributed to the potential for human intervention 
to address invasive species and opportunities for ecological enhancement.  
Conservation was regarded as the best option to address the socio-cultural criteria 
(Cultural Identity and Education) and Safe Interaction with Nature by a significant margin.  
However, these were regarded as the least important criteria by this participant. Additionally, 
Economic Growth, the most important criteria to this participant, was the least adequately 
addressed by Conservation (4.09 points). Therefore, Conservation was indicated as the least 
preferred option overall by participant S1 (22.68%).  
Although the least preferred option was subject to change during the sensitivity analysis, 
Alternate Development remained the most preferred option in most cases. This was only subject 
to change if the weights of the least preferred criteria (Education and Cultural Identity) were 
dramatically increased, resulting in the overall preference for Conservation by a small margin 
while Development as Planned decreased in acceptability. Overall, participant S1 supports 
Alternate Development while Conservation and Development as Planned are subject to change in 
preference.  
8.2.7 Participant D1 
The results of Participant D1 are shown in Table 11 and Figure 8. Economic Growth 
(48%) was the most important criteria to this participant by a significant margin while Safe 
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Interaction with Nature (8%) was the least important. Environmental Sustainability, typically 
identified as one of the most important criteria to most participants, was ranked relatively low in 
terms of importance to the participant (12%). While Cultural Identity (22%) was believed to be 
the second most important criteria.  
 
Table 11 D1 Impact Matrix 
 
Figure 8 D1 Impact Matrix 
It should be noted that during the evaluation of Economic Growth, Participant D1 
expressed dissatisfaction with the three options presented and instead opted to consolidate the 
two development options (Alternate Development and Development as Planned) into one, 
therefore conducting a simple evaluation of Conservation against Development in general. In this 
case, the participant articulated that Conservation and Development in general would have the 
same effect on Niagara’s economy. However, due to the evaluation format of OPTamos, it was 
not possible to consolidate these options when evaluating one specific criteria. To accommodate 
this view, it was assumed that both development options would have the same effect on 
Economic Growth. Therefore, all three options were thought to have the same expected outcome 
when considering Economic Growth.  
It was thought that all three options would have the same expected outcome for many of 
the criteria. The reasoning for this was that the participant thought that all options should always 
be trying to find a balance. This was the outcome for all criteria except for evaluating the 
Criteria Conservation Alternate Development Development as Planned Inconsistency ratio % of importance
Environmental Sustainability 19.83 14.05 66.12 0.43 12.00
Safe Interaction with Nature 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00 8.00
Cultural Identity 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00 22.00
Education 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00 10.00




expected outcome to Environmental Sustainability for which it was thought that Development as 
Planned (66.12 points) would ensure the most desirable outcome. While Conservation (19.83 
points) and Alternate Development (14.05 points) were thought to provide little desirable 
outcomes. Therefore, Development as Planned (37.27%) resulted as the most desirable option 
overall. While Conservation (31.71%) and Alternate Development (31.02%) closely followed.  
Since the three options were expected to have very similar outcomes, a sensitivity 
analysis showed very little change to the order of preferred options regardless of the weight 
assigned to each criterion. Development as Planned consistently resulted as the most preferred 
option while Conservation was closely followed by Alternate Development. A broader 
discussion to interpret the combined results and their implications on wetland management in 
Ontario will proceed in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
Reviewing the results from individual SMCE’s it appears that there is a split between 
participants who support Conservation and Alternate Development (3-3), with one participant 
supporting Development as Planned. It should be noted that many participants expressed 
discomfort with Development as Planned because of the destruction of wetlands that, under the 
conditions of the option in this study, were no longer deemed provincially significant under the 
authority of the MNRF. It should be noted that for Development as Planned to be implemented 
in practice without violating provincial policy, MNRF would need to remove PSW designations 
on the property. This would only occur if the authority believed that the wetlands no longer met 
the criteria of the OWES, which some participants felt it does not. The Niagara Falls City 
Council approved the first stage of the development process (OPA 128) with recommendations 
that further study be undertaken by the developer to ensure designated PSWs were not negatively 
impacted. It should also be noted that OPA 128 provides guidelines should the designations be 
removed, which is for the wetlands to assume the status of adjacent wetlands.  
The option most supported often correlated with the criteria the participant found most 
important. For example, if a participant identified Environmental Sustainability as the most 
important criteria, they were more likely to favour Conservation. This was true for three out of 
the four participants who favoured Environmental Sustainability as the most important criteria.  
Additionally, if a participant identified Economic Growth as the most important criteria, they 
were more likely to identify Alternate Development as the most acceptable option. This was the 
case for two out of the three participants who favoured Economic Growth, with the third 
favouring Development as Planned. No participant who favoured Economic Growth identified 
Conservation as the most favourable option. However, one participant who favoured 
Environmental Sustainability favoured Alternate Development. Although this participant 
favoured Environmental Sustainability, the reasoning aligned with those who favoured Alternate 
Development, which was that intervention was necessary to address the threats to biodiversity 
and ecological functions through rehabilitation and enhancement measures.  
Therefore, the acceptable option is often correlated with the highest ranked criteria, which 
varies among participants. Although the preferred option varied among participants, the 
sensitivity analysis demonstrated that despite changes to the weights assigned to the criteria, the 
participants still believed their given option would have the most desirable outcome. However, 
the high inconsistency ratio resulting from the expected outcomes of each criterion assessed by 
each participant should be carefully considered when interpreting the results, as many 
participants held onto preconceived biases towards certain options. 
Throughout the SMCE process, it was clear from discussions with participants and data 
analysis that conflicts between the desire for economic development and wetland conservation 
continue to be viewed as opposing goals in Ontario. As has been explored above, Ontario relies 
on a command and control approach that uses several policy tools and institutions to govern and 
protect wetlands. The most significant policy tools are the OWES, Planning Act (1990), and 
Conservation Authorities Act (1990). The OWES is used to determine the significance and level 
of protection warranted to a given wetland complex, while the Planning Act, including the PPS, 
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outlines policies and limitations to which all decisions made at the regional and local level must 
comply with. Additionally, the Conservation Authorities Act and the Planning Act set penalties 
for noncompliance. This governance structure suggests that Ontario utilizes a command and 
control approach to wetland management. The repeated offences against the Conservation 
Authorities Act in this case study may highlight inefficiencies with the use of applied sanctions 
to control behaviour. Alternatively, repeated offences may be due to the lack of perceived 
economic cost attributed with receiving a fine when compared to the potential cost of forgoing 
development plans, both of which are common criticisms of command and control policies.  
Based on this case study, it appears that provincial policies are generally being enforced at 
the provincial level by the MNRF and MMA. However, participants highlighted several concerns 
regarding processes of implementing policies and political influences behind decision-making at 
the regional and local level that threaten Ontario’s wetlands. Some of these concerns are rooted 
in a series of amendments of key provincial environmental legislation, including the Planning 
Act and the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, known as Bill 108, that seeks to streamline 
government processes.  
All participants mentioned that they were not opposed to development in Niagara Falls. 
However, many believe that the geographical area it is being proposed (within proximity to 
PSWs) is the on-going concern. Some participants, when asked what the conflict is about, 
described it as an enviro-political issue, referring to concerns that political processes governing 
land use decision-making were being mis-used by local government officials and threaten PSWs. 
This may inform why a significant focus of discussions with participants were on environmental 
evaluation criteria and the political processes threatening them. 
Criticisms of the OWES classification of PSWs continues to be a topic of debate among 
several participants who question the validity and merit of some PSWs on the property. This is 
also reflected in the 2017 EIS’s recommendation to remove almost 11 acres of PSWs on the 
property. This argument is mainly centred around past and present functions of disturbed and 
arguably man-made wetlands. However, participants supporting OWES argue these disturbed 
wetlands, although less biologically diverse, play a critical role in protecting the functions of the 
property as a whole and the future sustainability of the larger, slough forest wetlands. This 
perspective supports the policy’s intent by the MNRF that entire wetland complexes are to be 
evaluated rather than of individual wetland pockets. It is also an important part of the debate 
among participants who supported Conservation as the most desirable option and those that 
supported Alternate Development.  
Processes to allow incomplete EIS’s to inform impacts of development on PSWs prior to 
the approval of the OPA 128 also raised concerns from some participants and the MNRF. 
Concerns are grounded in the PPS which prohibit site alteration to PSWs and their adjacent lands 
unless it has been demonstrated that there will be no negative impact to the natural features and 
functions. Despite incomplete mapping of species’ habitat, Niagara Falls city council approved 
the OPA 128 (the first step of the project’s approval process) along with twenty-seven 
recommendations for the developer to address. Many participants felt that the recommendations 
should have been addressed prior to approval in order to fully inform environmental impacts of 
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the proposed project and by not doing so was a result of city officials pushing for their own 
agenda. This mistrust in public officials to obtain full ecological impacts as a result of 
development led several participants to support Conservation as the most acceptable policy 
approach.  
These concerns were also highlighted in discussions with participants about the degree of 
inclusivity and adequate consultation in the decision-making process, particularly through public 
meetings regarding OPAs required under the Planning Act. Several participants, including a 
Niagara Falls city councillor, expressed dissatisfaction with how public meetings are conducted. 
Many felt that the vote among City Council had already been decided prior to public 
consultations and citizens who spoke at the meeting had little influence on the decision. This was 
demonstrated in the public meeting regarding OPA 128’s approval in which most speakers 
opposed its approval. This led many participants to believe that public meetings are treated by 
city council as a procedural formality rather than an opportunity for the public to provide input 
on land use decisions. Additionally, these concerns are further exacerbated by changes to the 
Planning Act proposed in Bill 108 which threaten to eliminate the requirement for approval 
authorities, often local municipalities, to give notice before deciding on a plan of subdivision 
application, thereby eliminating the opportunity for the public to be consulted on development 
projects moving forward in the approval process (Niagara Region, 2019).  
An alternative avenue for the public to challenge land use decisions is the LPAT. 
However, the LPAT has recently undergone several changes, including the closing of the Local 
Planning Appeal Support Centre (Tribunals Ontario, 2019) that had previously assisted residents 
in navigating the complicated processes of the LPAT, including free legal services to assist with 
decision appeals (Crawley, 2019). The LPAT is therefore seen as another procedural obstacle for 
concerned citizens, which further limits opportunities for public participation in land use 
decision-making and holding city officials accountable. Changes to the LPAT Act under Bill 108 
would include restrictions to third party appeals of plans for subdivision and certain official plan 
amendments, thereby giving greater autonomy of decision-making to municipalities while 
reducing opportunities for public consultations. Changes would also limit evidence and expert 
witnesses prior to hearings at the Tribunal’s discretion. Participants claim such changes to the 
appeal process make a complicated process more difficult for those trying to navigate the system.  
As outlined in the historical analysis above, the NPCA has received many criticisms 
regarding its management and operations. This includes political influences working alongside 
developers to push approvals through and address procedures protecting wetlands. In her report, 
the Auditor General identified several instances of conflicts of interest among NPCA members. 
Although conflicts of interest with regards to fiduciary duties is outlined in the NPCA’s Code of 
Conduct, it remains unclear how their roles as elected municipal officials may present competing 
and conflicting interests.  
Failure to address violations to the Conservation Authorities Act, including damage to 
PSWs, was highlighted in the Auditor General’s report. The lack of applied deterrent 
mechanisms by the NPCA has also been demonstrated by the repeated violations to the Act by 
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the landowner in this study. This result also supports literature highlighting the inefficiencies and 
challenges encountered by command and control instruments.  
Several participants noted that they became involved in the dispute as a result of 
‘questionable’ proposals put forth by the NPCA. These participants expressed feeling 
disappointed that an agency, whose responsibility includes the enforced protection of PSWs, was 
allowing wetlands to be destroyed without proper enforcement and compensation. This led 
participants to monitor the NPCA’s decisions and hold its Board to account by rallying public 
support against the Board in the following election. Something participants expressed they 
should not have to do, rather they should be able to go about their lives knowing provincial 
policy was being adequately enforced by governing institutions. As a result of the work of 
prominent concerned citizens, a new Board was elected, which several participants feel have 
fewer ties to municipal operations and can hold private landowners to account more effectively. 
This change in Board members played a small but significant role in the evaluation of Alternate 
Development as an acceptable option. It was felt that with an accountable public authority, PSWs 
could be monitored and protected from adverse impacts more effectively than private ownership.  
Alternatively, some participants feel that the policies and procedures have been followed 
as required by provincial law and therefore should be reflective of an environmentally safe and 
conscious practice. Two EIS were completed along with an addendum to inform the ecological 
impacts. Draft plans for subdivision and zoning bylaw amendment requests have also been 
submitted that accommodate environmental protection areas. Therefore, some participants felt 
that development could safely occur on the property without negatively impacting PSWs, 
thereby supporting Alternate Development and Development as Planned as viable and 
ecologically sensitive options.  
Some participants expressed support for a level of development (Alternate Development 
and Development as Planned) on the property if wetlands and their buffers are respected. 
However, several participants felt more reassured that development could proceed without 
impacting wetlands if a public authority took ownership and responsibility for protecting them. 
This desire for change in ownership was fueled by the poor relationship the project applicant 
holds with the public as a result of two violations against the Conservation Authorities Act for 
negatively impacting wetlands or their buffers. It is believed by these participants that a public 
authority would be held to a higher level of accountability for managing and protecting natural 
heritage features. Therefore, more participants were found to favour Alternate Development 
(publicly owned wetlands) over Development as Planned (privately owned wetlands).  
Additionally, the poor relationship the project applicant has with the public also 
contributes to the lack of confidence in the adequate recreation of biodiversity offsets. Although 
participants stated the questionable offsetting proposal put forth by the NPCA was the initial 
cause of concern, proposals by the project applicant on the methods of creating offsets were 
cause for many participants to reject biodiversity offsetting on the property. Concerns over 
wetland offsetting techniques lacking scientific credibility led many participants to fear the 
project applicant’s role in ensuring lasting ecological functions. The lack of scientific evidence 
supporting reliable recreation processes and the ambiguity of a responsible authority for creating 
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and maintaining offsets are both common criticisms of biodiversity offsetting and often result in 
the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of such programs.   
Although biodiversity offsetting makes an attempt to compromise between economic 
development and the protection of biodiversity, both of which are supported by the study 
participants, concerns continue to be unaddressed over the ability to achieve the same habitat 
structure, species composition, ecosystem function, human use and cultural values associated 
with biodiversity. These concerns thereby reiterate criticisms by Bull et al. (2013) of accepting 
ecological losses in the face of uncertain gains.  
A PES program was also denied feasibility due to the high cost associated with foregoing 
development. In principle, if the potential profits of an alternative land use (e.g. land 
development) are too high, ES users will be ill-equipped to sufficiently compensate landowners 
to pursue conservation practices (Wunder, 2013; Muradian et al., 2013). According to Engel et 
al. (2008), payments must exceed any additional benefits the ES provider (landowner) would 
receive from alternative land use. Participants thought that the residents of the Niagara Region 
would not collectively support the allocation of millions of dollars towards a private landowner 
to conserve a wetland complex. Therefore, the Niagara Region’s WTP was much lower than the 
project applicant’s WTA and according to Wunder (2005), if transactions are not voluntary and 
ES users do not identify themselves as direct users, a PES program will not be successful. The 
culture necessary for PES programs as described by Wunder (2013) does not appear to be 
present in the City of Niagara Falls. In a society where common pool resources are typically free 
a PES program may seem inappropriate.  
Although market-based instruments receive support in broader literature to address the 
inefficiencies of command and control policies, they have not received general support by the 
participants in the City of Niagara Falls. Echoing concerns from scholars such as McAfee 
(1990), Van Hecken et al. (2015), and Kolinjivadi et al. (2019), the concept of selling nature to 
save it was a new and difficult concept for participants to support. Several participants, 
especially those supporting Conservation, felt biodiversity offsetting would diminish the value of 
the wetlands and would further degrade them after they were relocated. It was argued, by 
conservationists in the study, that offsetting would ultimately tie the sustainability of the 
wetlands to the project applicant who has little incentive to ensure wetland functions are 
adequately replicated and maintained. This is a similar criticism that biodiversity offsetting has 
received in the United States and the failure to achieve no net loss targets of biodiversity 
(Silverstein, 1994; Brown & Lant, 1999; Calvet et al., 2015). Additionally, the lack of existing 
public policy guiding and regulating a market in Ontario makes it difficult for participants, most 
of which are not familiar with or typically included in the decision-making process, to support a 
new and unfamiliar policy.  
The SMCE proved valuable in highlighting these governance concerns and applying 
them towards the identification of acceptable solutions to a land use conflict. The criteria 
identified by participants addressed social, economic, and environmental concerns. Although 
discussions were predominantly focused around environmental concerns, participants recognized 
the inter-connected and inter-dependency of the conflict. Although results had a high 
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inconsistency rate, the evaluation required participants to assess and discuss the conflict from 
multiple dimensions, leading to a more constructive discussion on acceptable solutions that had 
not been attempted in the past. This supports the literature on SMCE and its value in addressing 
environmental conflicts. It should be noted again that SMCE are not meant to solve all conflicts 
but are able to provide insight into the nature of the conflict and assist at arriving at political 
compromises by increasing the level of transparency in the decision-making process.  
The policy discrepancies and ambiguity in the approach to wetland conservation, in 
addition to the perceived lack of adequate public consultation in the decision-making process, 
may contribute to the ongoing conflict between developers and the general public on the 
management of wetlands in Ontario. It may also inform the split results among participants in the 
case study between the desire for Conservation and Alternate Development. Although it is 
unanimously agreed among participants that PSWs should be protected to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of their natural features and functions, there remains significant differences in 





Chapter 10: Conclusion  
In what Kim (2010) describes as the Era of Wetland Conservation, developed countries 
are moving towards the development of wetland policies to preserve wetland ecosystem 
functions and services with new technology and systems aimed at facilitating the wise and 
sustainable use of wetlands. In Canada, Ontario is seeking to achieve this through command and 
control measures enforced by key policies such as the Planning Act and Conservation 
Authorities Act. Ontario has recognized the urgent need to address the continued loss of wetland 
ES in its Wetland Conservation Strategy and this study has helped inform the Strategy’s 2030 
targets by providing insight into competing interests over wetlands in the province.  
This study has addressed the research questions by exploring different wetland 
management approaches and comparing them to Ontario’s current approach. In order to address 
and inform challenges faced in Ontario, local stakeholders participating in the SMCE identified 
acceptable compromises to a specific land use conflict. Although the SMCE faced challenges 
with a high inconsistency rate, the study ultimately served as an effective communication 
platform for competing interests in order to inform the province’s policy challenges.  
Each step of the SMCE informed the decision-making framework by seeking insight 
from the community. The evaluation not only highlighted management challenges of the current 
policy framework but also provided an opportunity for open dialogue for stakeholders to voice 
the rationale behind their concerns. Including information gathered by discussions with local 
stakeholders provided a deeper level of understanding of the conflict, relationships, and potential 
areas for compromise that would not have been identified otherwise. Additionally, the decision-
making software, OPTamos, provided a secure, simple, and efficient tool to conduct the impact 
matrix to easily highlight participants’ preferences.  
Ontario addresses wetland management at the provincial, regional, and municipal level. 
However, Ontario’s wetland policies appear to be experiencing challenges at the regional and 
local level in terms of implementation and enforcement of provincial policies. Although the 
overall rate of wetland loss in the province has declined (Ontario Government, 2017), conflicts 
between the desire for economic development and wetland conservation persist. The case study 
in the City of Niagara Falls reflects an ongoing tension in wetland management between societal 
actors seeking economic development and those seeking environmental sustainability.  
 Future studies should attempt to include more participants who support development and 
those formally involved in the decision-making process in order to balance and inform the 
sample of participants. Due to the time restrictions and limited resources of the study, input from 
government officials was mainly obtained from FOI request correspondences rather than input 
from SMCE discussions. Including discussions and evaluations from government officials would 
provide a deeper understanding of the current operations of the decision-making process at each 
level of government. Also, the politically sensitive nature of the conflict contributed to the lack 
of representation from individuals supporting development. Further insight into opinions 
supporting development would help inform the decision-making process by representing a more 
diverse and representative sample of the conflict. Insight into how provincial policies are being 
interpreted and implemented by each jurisdiction may also provide clarity during discussions 
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with other participants who are not directly involved and often rely on media reports to inform 
opinions.  
 Although several constraints were identified in this SMCE model, the analysis proved 
useful in demonstrating how Ontario’s use of command and control policies address conflicts 
between economic development and wise and sustainable use of wetlands. The attitudes among 
diverse stakeholders with regards to sustainable land use decision-making of wetlands in Ontario 
were also addressed in the analysis. Overcoming the limitations identified in this study would 
provide a deeper understanding of the challenges Ontario faces with regards to the protection of 
significant wetlands and provide insight into opportunities for acceptable solutions moving 
forward. This study and future contributions may also prove valuable in resolving regional land 
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Safe interaction with nature -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cultural Identity
Safe interaction with nature -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Education
Safe interaction with nature -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Econmic growth
Safe interaction with nature -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Affordable housing
Environmental Sustainability -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Safe interaction with nature
Environmental Sustainability -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cultural Identity
Environmental Sustainability -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Education
Environmental Sustainability -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Econmic growth
Environmental Sustainability -9 8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Affordable housing
+ High- High - Mid -Low + Low + Mid
+ High
- High - Mid -Low + Low + Mid + High
- High - Mid -Low + Low + Mid
+ High
- High - Mid -Low + Low + Mid + High
- High - Mid -Low + Low + Mid
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Appendix B: Wetland Policies 
Niagara Falls Official Plan Amendments  
Policy Relevant Provisions Mention 
of 
Wetlands 







The Amendment reclassifies the area of Thundering Waters 
from industrial to residential. The extent of the residential 
designations and Environmental Protection Area 
designation may be affected by environmental studies yet 
to be completed at the time of the amendment and will be 




2.5 Natural Heritage System  
2.5.3 & 2.5.4 Provincially 
Significant Wetlands 




Amendments to Official Plans set out policies to guide a 
particular development project by addressing land use 
management, the protection of natural heritage features 
(woodlands, wetlands, significant species habitat, 
endangered and threatened species) and municipal services.  
The specific provisions addressing wetlands designates any 
PSW identified by MNRF as Environmental Protection 
Area. However, if a feature no longer holds its PSW status 
by MNRF, it shall assume the land use designation of the 
adjacent land use provided that it fails to meet other criteria 
(e.g. Significant Wildlife Habitat) in which case the 
applicable policies of the OPA shall apply.  
A thirty (30) metre buffer shall be established to protect 
natural heritage features. The buffer may be increased or 
decreased based on an approved Environmental Impact 
Study (EIS).  
Any development that has the potential to negatively effect 
PSWs is required to undergo an EIS to the satisfaction of 









Summary of Provisions  
Planning Act 
(1990) 
2.0 Provincial Interests 
16.1 Contents of official plan 
16.14 Climate change policies  




The Act addresses economic development within municipalities 
while protecting the natural environment through land use planning. 
The Minister, municipal council, board and Tribunal have the ability 
to carry out these responsibilities with regard to ecological systems 
and natural areas. Municipalities shall provide official plans that 
address social, economic, built or natural environments of the 
municipality. The contents of such plans must be in accordance with 
provincial legislation such as the Planning Act. Additionally, zoning 
by-laws may be passed by municipal councils for the purpose of 






1.2.6 Land Use Compatibility 
2.1 Wise Use & Management 





Under section 3 of the Planning Act, 2008. Prohibits development & 
site alteration on “significant wetlands”, “significant coastal 
wetlands” unless no negative impacts to the natural features or their 
ecological functions have been demonstrated. No development and 
site alternation is permitted to habitat of endangered species or 
threatened species except in accordance with provincial and federal 
requirements. Includes protection of ‘adjacent’ lands unless 
ecological function of the adjacent land is demonstrated to not 
negatively impact the natural features and functions.  
There is no standard buffer size mentioned. It only mentions that 
major facilities and sensitive land uses should be appropriately 
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14.1 Members of authority 
19.1 By-laws 
21.1 Powers of authorities  
23.1 Minister’s powers 
25 & 27 Local Planning 
Appeal Tribunal 
28. Regulations of areas over 







Gives conservation authorities (CAs) the ability to regulate activities 
regarding natural resources in watersheds within a given region 
designated by the Minister of the Environment, Conservation and 
Parks. CAs are representatives of municipalities, appointed by city 
council. CAs have authority to conserve, regulate or approve 
development of areas within their jurisdiction. However, appeal 
processes are in place which allow municipalities and individuals 
recognized by the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal to hold CAs 
accountable. 
A CA has the authority to issue orders to remove development, 





8.1 Scope of powers 
8.2 Ambiguity  
8.3 Scope of by-law making 
power 
9.0 Powers of a natural person 
11.2 By-laws  
23.3.1 Powers that cannot be 
delegated 
135.1 Tree by-laws 
151.1 Powers re licences 
153.2 Compliance with land 







The Act outlines jurisdiction and powers of municipalities. Wetlands 
are not specifically mentioned but planning and development 
regulations are the responsibility of the municipality which can be 
determined through by-laws. However, the Minister of Municipal 
Affairs may override areas of regulation and some require the 




3.0 Application of Act 
6.2 Preparation of 
environmental assessment: 
Contents 
6.3 Public notice of 
submission 
7.6 Rejection of 
environmental assessment  





The Act seeks to protect, conserve and promote the wise 
management of the environment in Ontario through an 
environmental assessment application process to which the Minister 






4.1 Advisory Committee 
6.2 Applications or requests 
to amend Plan 
7.0 Consultation during 
preparation of plan 
9.0 Contents of Plan 
22.0 Regulations 
23.0 Regulations  
24. Development Permits 
 
 
The Minister may make regulations of ‘development control’ for 
which no person shall develop in the area unless specifically exempt 
by a development permit. Violation may result in fines to individuals 




9.1 Prohibition on killing, etc. 
10.1 Prohibition on damage to 
habitat, etc. 
28.1 Habitat protection order 
28.2 Contents of order 




No person is permitted to kill, harm, capture, sell or buy species 
listed on the Species at Risk in Ontario List. This includes species 
that reside and are dependent on wetlands for habitat, reproduction or 
feeding. The Minister may make an order if it is believed an activity 
is destructive or seriously damaging to an important feature of a 
habitat for a species that requires the activity to stop or take steps to 
rehabilitate an area. Monetary fines are set to discourage violation of 









Wetlands are specifically included in the term ‘conservation land’. 
The owner of land may allow an easement to enter into a covenant 
with conservation bodies to conserve, maintain, restore or enhance 
land or wildlife on the land. The landowner can also do so for the 
purposes of protecting water quality and quantity, in addition to 









Wetlands are not specifically mentioned but ‘land’ is defined in the 
Act to include ‘land covered by water’ and ‘natural environment’ 
includes ‘land and water, or any combination or part thereof’. The 
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14.1 Prohibition, discharge of 
contaminant 
17.0 Remedial orders 
18.2 Grounds for order 
97.1 Orders by Minister, 
spills 
100.1.1 Municipality’s order 
for costs and expenses 
124.0 Control orders 
128.0 Content of stop order 
168.12.2 Actions taken by 
municipalities 









Act seeks to protect and conserve the natural environment, from 
contaminants, particularly by prohibiting contaminants that are 
discharged as a result of human action and cause or have the potential 
to cause adverse effects to the natural environment or animal or plant 
life. Orders can be issued by the Director or Minister to repair 
damages and take measures to prevent or reduce damages by the 
responsible party. An Environmental Council is also established to 
advise the Minister on current research relating to the protection of 
the natural environment and pollution. Monetary fines are established 




5.3 Temporary designation of 
invasive species 
7.0 Prohibited invasive 
species 




13.1 Prevention and response 
plans 
13.2 Content of Plans 
22.1 Order re: unknown 
invasive species 
22.2 Order to contain 
suspected species 
25 Compliance orders 
27. Actions to control or 
eradicate invasive species  
44.1 Penalties 










Wetlands are not specifically mentioned but ‘harm to the natural 
environment’ in the Act refers to adverse effects to biodiversity of 
ecological processes or to the natural resources. The Act includes the 
issue of orders by the Minister or an inspector that requires the 
prevention, elimination, or reduction of adverse effects of invasive 
species on public or private property. It also prohibits restricted 
species from being brought into the province. Penalties against the 
Act include imprisonment, fines, or an order requiring a particular 
action be, or not be taken.  
Place to Grow 
Act (2005) 
6.0 Contents of Plan  
 
 
Act enables decisions about growth to be made with the purpose of 
sustaining a robust economic, strong communities and promote a 
healthy environment. The Growth Plan may contain policies to 
protect sensitive and significant lands, including agricultural lands 





Appendix C: Property Air Photos  
 
Air photo of the property taken in 1965 from the Brock University Air Photo Library. 
 
Air Photo taken of the property in 2015 from the Brock University Air Photo Library. 
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Appendix D: Development as Planned 
This map was used as a visual reference for the management option ‘Development as Planned’ 
(assuming PSW designations are removed) and the baseline to generate alternative options 
during the SMCE. 
 




Appendix E: Alternate Development 
This map was used as a visual reference for the Alternate Development option.  
 
 
 
